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I. INTRODUCTION
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.1 has been with us for
over 20 years. The case itself was a products liability civil suit, but the decision
upended the calculus of scientific evidence in federal courts. The use of Daubert
in criminal cases has been awkward and somewhat clunky for those 20-plus
years. Nonetheless, its execution in criminal cases should be revisited. The use
of forensic science in criminal cases, much like the use of Daubert, is at an
awkward stage. It has been seven years since headlines screamed that forensic
science suffers from a basic lack of actual scientific research to support many
forensic science disciplines. 2 That lack of research led to testimony-and closing
arguments-that exceeded the boundaries of the science. Inaccuracies,
impossible statistics, and misstatements about the certainty of the conclusion
have been recurring themes in legal, academic, and media discourse.3 Crime lab
scandals exposing evidence tampering, perjury, and falsified results represented
an even more troubling aspect of forensic science errors.4
In a perfect world, we would like to assume that the court system is
responsible for-and effective at-weeding out the forensic riffraff so that we
avoid the ultimate consequence of imprisoning innocent people. As a legal and
societal matter, the need for reliable scientific evidence in cases that irreparably
affect people's liberty should be obvious. Moreover, the number of cases (both
civil and criminal) that depend upon and revolve around scientific evidence only
increases as technology advances.5 But neither gravity nor volume has
meaningfully influenced an evidentiary landscape that grants free admission to
509 U.S. 579 (1993).
2 See generally NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, NAT'L ACAD. OF SC., STRENGTHENING FORENSIC
SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD (2009) [hereinafter NAS REPORT].
3 See, e.g., Brandon L. Garrett & Peter J. Neufeld, Invalid Forensic Science Testimony and
Wrongful Convictions, 95 VA. L. REv. 1, 12 (2009). This study found that in 60% of cases involving
forensic testing the forensic analyst provided some form of invalid testimony. Id. at 9; Denise
Lavoie, Ex-state Chemist Annie Dookhan Pleads Not Guilty, BOS. GLOBE (Jan. 31, 2013),
https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2013/01/3 1/chemist-annie-dookhan-pleads-not-guilty-
obstruction/8LS1UcGVCpXkSHYred9oml/story.html.
4 See, e.g., Madeleine Baran, Ramsey County Medical Examiner Michael McGee Under
Investigation, MPR NEWS (Sept. 6, 2011), https://www.mprnews.org/story/2011/09/05/ramsey-
county-medical-examiner-faces-investigation; Justin Peters, The Unsettling, Underregulated
World of Crime Labs, SLATE (Jan. 14, 2013, 3:46 PM),
http://www.slate.com/blogs/crime/2013/01/14/serritamitchell-dna-the unsettling-underregulate
d_world of crimelabs.html; Paul C. Giannelli, The North Carolina Crime Lab Scandal, 27 CRIM.
JUST., no. 1, Spring 2012,
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/criminal-justice-magazine/sp 12-sci
evidence.authcheckdam.pdf.
5 See NAS REPORT, supra note 2, at 85.
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forensic science in criminal cases. 6 Courts have admitted testimony from the
panoply of forensic science disciplines without any evidence to establish either
the validity of the approach or the accuracy of the conclusions. The 2009 NAS
Report marked a tipping point in forensic science.7 The Report concluded that a
"'Badly Fragmented' Forensic Science System Needs Overhaul."8
Congressionally mandated, the Report found "serious deficiencies" in the
forensic science system and called for a severe overhaul and the implementation
of stringent research in forensic science. 9 The Report further underscored the
utter lack of "peer-reviewed, published studies establishing the scientific bases
and reliability of many forensic methods."1
Although many forensic practitioners perceived the Report as an attack
aimed solely at the forensic science field,1' the Report held multiple parties
responsible for the lack of reliability in forensic science, including the end-user:
"the courts have been utterly ineffective in addressing this problem."1 2 For its
part, forensic science, as an industry, is responding to the call to action.' 3 The
same cannot be said of the legal system. The phrase "utterly ineffective" certainly
puts the onus on the courts as well, and for good reason.
State and federal courts have embraced forensic science without
subjecting it to the kind of scrutiny that is required of novel scientific or technical
evidence in civil cases (more on that later). Instead, courts acquiesce to the
6 Paul Giannelli, Daubert and Criminal Prosecutions, 26 CRIM. JUST., no. 3, Fall 2011,
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/criminal-justice-magazine/fal lSciE
vidence.authcheckdam.pdf.
7 Id.; Press Release, Nat'l Acad. of Sci., 'Badly Fragmented' Forensic Science System Needs
Overhaul; Evidence to Support Reliability of Many Techniques Is Lacking (Feb. 18, 2009),
http://www8.nationalacademies.org/onpinews/newsitem.aspx?RecordlD= 12589.
8 Press Release, Nat'l Acad. of Sci., supra note 7; NAS REPORT, supra note 2.
9 Press Release, Nat'l Acad. of Sci., supra note 7.
10 Id.; NAS REPORT, supra note 2.
11 See Matthew Clarke, Crime Labs in Crisis: Shoddy Forensics Used to Secure Convictions,
PRISON LEGAL NEWS (Oct. 15, 2010), https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/201 0/oct/i 5/crime-
labs-in-crisis-shoddy-forensics-used-to-secure-convictions/ (reporting that officials who run crime
labs were predictably outraged by the NAS Report); Gregory S. Klees, SWGGUNInitial Response
to the NAS Report, SCI. WORKING GRP. FOR FIREARMS & TOOLMARKS,
http://www.swggun.org/index.php?option=com-content&view=article&id=37&Itemid=22 (last
visited Nov. 3, 2016) (indicating the Scientific Working Group for Firearms and Toolmarks was
already aware of the scientific and systemic issues presented in the NAS Report).
12 NAS REPORT, supra note 2, at 53.
13 The National Commission on Forensic Science ("NCFS") was established by the
Department of Justice in 2013 in parmership with the National Institute of Standards and
Technology. The goal of the NCFS is "to enhance the practice and improve the reliability of
forensic science." Brought about in part because of the NAS Report, the NCFS seeks to "promote
scientific validity, reduce fragmentation, and improve federal coordination of forensic science."
National Commission on Forensic Science, U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., http://www.justice.gov/ncfs (last
visited Nov. 3, 2016).
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untested arguments that forensic science is (1) generally accepted, (2) scientific,
and (3) reliable. 14 None of these assumptions have been subjected to adequate
scrutiny from either a scientific or a legal standpoint.
Courts have allowed unproven forensic science to perpetuate its leaps of
faith by operating under several assumptions promoted by both the forensic
science community and the lawyers who rely on that evidence. First is the notion
that uniqueness is embedded in a forensic discipline that enables it to identify a
piece of evidence and reliably attribute it back to a single source. This may be
true of DNA (and even DNA can be fallible),15 but for other evidence, namely,
pattern identification evidence,'16 that notion is a leap of faith that lacks scientific
foundation. 7 Second is the assumption that the associated method of analysis is
14 See infra note 23.
15 Courts, lawyers, crime labs, and the media often refer to DNA evidence as the "gold
standard." See, e.g., Jonathan Jones, Forensic Tools: What's Reliable and What's Not-So-
Scientific, PBS FRONTLINE (Apr. 17, 2012), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/forensic-
tools-whats-reliable-and-whats-not-so-scientific/. That claim holds up for the most part in a single
profile comparison: one profile in the evidence to compare with one suspect-il:1 is always the
easiest. DNA mixtures, however, present a far more difficult conundrum. Progress in analysis and
data interpretation techniques have caused practitioners to modify how they calculate probabilities
when it comes to individualizing a suspect from a DNA mixture. On the one hand, this is a good
thing: Better science equates to more reliable convictions. On the other hand, lots of cases were
subject to substandard practices.
In August 2015, the Texas Forensic Science Commission publicly revealed serious issues
with DNA mixture interpretation. TEX. FORENSIC Sc1. COMM'N, UNINTENDED CATALYST: THE
EFFECTS OF 1999 AND 2001 FBI STR POPULATION DATA CORRECTIONS ON AN EVALUATION OF DNA
MIXTURE INTERPRETATION IN TEXAS (2015), http://tidc.texas.gov/media/40444/Memo-
Presentation-from-Texas-Forensic-Science-Commission.pdf Among the revelations: in May
2015, the FBI notified crime laboratories it had identified "minor discrepancies" in its population
databases that have been used by labs in DNA analysis since 1999. The FBI attributed the
discrepancies to human error and technological limitations. Id.
16 For much forensic science, "the human examiner is the main instrument of analysis" where
the forensic analyst examines "visual patterns and determines if they are 'sufficiently similar' to
conclude that they originate from the same source." Saul M. Kassin et al., The Forensic
Confirmation Bias: Problems, Perspectives, and Proposed Solutions, 2 J. APPLIED RES. MEMORY
& COGNITION 42, 43 (2013). Forensic science disciplines have been divided into two main
classifications: laboratory based disciplines and disciplines based on "expert interpretation of
observed patterns." NAS REPORT, supra note 2, at 38. Included in the first classification are DNA
analysis, toxicology, and drug analysis. Id. Disciplines with a basis in expert interpretations have
the goal of determining a common source for patterns observed in, but not limited to, fingerprints,
writing samples, and toolmarks. See id.
17 In what may be a simplistic explanation of the distinction, the lab disciplines also bring
quantitative results that have a more objective nature in what they represent. Jessica D. Gabel,
Realizing Reliability in Forensic Science from the Ground Up, 104 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
283, 291 (2014). DNA results, for example, are reported in the "all-important statistical
representation of the likelihood of a random match based on population genetics-i.e., the
pervasive '1 in n billion' number." Id. Consequently, the lab-based forensic disciplines embody a
more analytical approach which makes them more reliable. Id. This can be compared to the more
subjective nature of "pattern identification" disciplines, which produce qualitative, non-numeric
[Vol. 119
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reliable. This specious logic leads to judicial acceptance (and in some cases
judicial notice), which is an important source in legitimating forensic science.18
That translates to a belief system that perpetuates the perception that forensic
evidence is scientific and reliable because courts said it was so.
This belief system is further sustained by the steady stream of alluring
yet fictional representations of forensic science in crime-solving serials and
popular media. 19 Packaging the complexities of forensic analysis in the digestible
form of exaggerated technology and concrete science, popular television
perpetuates unrealistic expectations for modem forensic techniques and obscures
their actual capabilities and limitations. 20 These misinformed fictions exert
significant influence over public perceptions and inadvertently permeate the
justice system, creating the so-called "CSI-effect. '2 1 The result is disappointing
in a legal system that has tried time and again to prevent junk science from
infecting cases and sending innocent people to prison. In 1993, the United States
Supreme Court issued its landmark opinion in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,22 a case aimed directly at stemming the tide of junk
science. In Daubert, the Court eliminated the old Frye test2 3 and fashioned a new
reliability test for the admissibility of expert testimony, one that incorporated the
significance of error rates and peer review in a given methodology and assigned
a "gatekeeping" role to the judge to effectively screen the evidence and
determine its admissibility. 4 Some viewed Daubert as opening the floodgates to
all manner of expert testimony, but the Court seemed to routinely enhance and
refine Daubert over the next several years. By 2000, the Court suggested that
results. Id. That being said, even DNA analysis is subject to human error based on the
interpretation. Id.
18 See, e.g., United States v. Martinez, 3 F.3d 1191 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that courts are
allowed to take judicial notice of reliability of general theory and techniques of DNA profiling).
19 See Jessica D. Gabel, Forensiphilia: Is Public Fascination with Forensic Science a Love
Affair or Fatal Attraction?, 36 NEw ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIv. CONFINEMENT 233, 237-40 (2010).
20 Id.
21 Id. at 240-46.
22 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
23 In 1923, James A. Frye appealed his conviction of second-degree murder to the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The court affirmed the conviction and
excluded expert evidence concerning lie detector results from an early predecessor of the
polygraph. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923); see infra Section I.A. 1.
In subsequent cases, this became known as the Frye test or the "general acceptance" rule,
and was viewed as a requirement for peer review of scientific evidence admitted into court. See
Thomas Lyons, Frye, Daubert and Where Do We Go from Here?, 45 R.I.B.J. 5 (1997).
24 See Giannelli, supra note 6.
25 See, e.g., Kuhmo Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner,
522 U.S. 136 (1997).
2016]
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Daubert served as an "exacting standard., 2 6 That same year, Daubert was
codified within the language of Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.27
One of the unforeseen consequences in the 20-plus years of the Daubert
regime is its unequal application in civil versus criminal cases. 28 To be blunt:
expert testimony in civil cases is habitually and stringently assessed under the
Daubert factors. The same cannot be said of expert testimony in criminal cases.
Rather, criminal cases favor admissibility over a rigorous assessment of
reliability (the so-called "weight vs. admissibility" argument).2 9
This is not an Article that seeks to equalize the admissibility standards
between civil and criminal cases. 30 Rather, this Article argues that the
admissibility of scientific evidence in criminal cases should be at least as
stringent as what is applied in civil cases. Of course, that begs the question
26 Weisgram v. Marley Co., 528 U.S. 440, 455 (2000).
27 In 1975, Congress enacted the Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 702 of which governs expert
testimony. In 2000, Rule 702 was amended in an attempt to codify and structure elements
embodied in the "Daubert trilogy" of Daubert, Joiner, and Kuhmo, and the rule then read:
Rule 702. Testimony by Experts
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education,
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony
is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable
principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and
methods reliably to the facts of the case.
FED. R. EvD. 702 (2000) (amended 2011).
In 2011, Rule 702 was again amended to make the language clearer. The rule now reads:
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if:
(a) the expert's scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue;
(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;
(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and
(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of
the case.
FED. R. EVID. 702.
Some court opinions still cite to pre-2000 opinions in determining the scope of Daubert, but any
earlier judicial rulings that conflict with the language of amended Rule 702 are no longer good
precedent.
28 Giannelli, supra note 6.
29 FRE 401 and Weight vs. Admissibility of the Evidence, FED. EVIDENCE REv.: EDITOR'S BLOG
(Apr. 30, 2010), http://federalevidence.com/blog/2010/april/fre-401-and-weight-vs-admissibility-
evidence.
30 That would require pages upon pages that compare the competing norms of civil and
criminal cases, including the relevant burdens of proof and the specter of "hired guns" in civil
cases. For a much better articulation of those issues, see Deirdre Dwyer, (Why) Are Civil and
Criminal Expert Evidence Different?, 43 TULSA L. REV. 381 (2007) and Paul Giannelli, The
Supreme Court's "Criminal'" Daubert Cases, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 1071 (2003).
[Vol. 119
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whether that necessary stringency is perfectly embodied by the Daubert/Rule
702 system or something different. I am not sure I can answer that question, but
I am certain that jurisdictions that have accepted Daubert in the civil arena resist
its application in the criminal context. For better or worse, Daubert is the best
available standard for scientific evidence. It should be uniformly adopted despite
its imperfections.
At a minimum, "criminalizing" Daubert once and for all would remove
the subpar treatment that expert testimony receives in criminal practice and
written procedure. The reliability of scientific evidence in criminal cases depends
upon implementing and enforcing comparable standards, and there are new
standards and research that have not yet seen the light of day in court. Reliability
is the bedrock of admissibility. As forensic science begins to adopt new and more
rigorous research and scientific methods, the legal system should
correspondingly scrutinize that research and apply evidentiary rules consistently
and predictably to that evidence.
Part II discusses the background of expert testimony and focuses on the
case law and statutory guidelines set out for expert testimony in Florida, Georgia,
West Virginia, and at the federal level. Part III attempts to reconcile the disparate
treatment scientific evidence rules in criminal cases and addresses prejudice,
cost, and constitutional concerns. Finally, Part IV proposes raising the standard
for expert testimony in criminal cases.
II. BACKGROUND
Expert testimony sometimes functions as the "rock star" of a trial, and it
has been that way for a number of years. Even at the federal level, however,
expert testimony has not always been subject to the qualifications set out by
Federal Rule of Evidence 70231 ("Rule 702") and Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.32 In fact, an expert rendering an opinion in court was not
31 Federal Rule of Evidence 702 governs expert testimony. FED. R. EVID. 702. The rule states:
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if:
(a) the expert's scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help
the trier of fact understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue;
(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;
(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and
(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of
the case.
Id.
32 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993) (holding that general acceptance is not a precondition of the
admissibility of scientific evidence under the Rules, and that the judge serves as the gatekeeper to
the reliability and relevance of the experts testimony).
2016]
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disputed until 1782 in Folkes v. Chadd.33 In Folkes, several experts appeared
before a jury to testify as to what caused the decay of a harbor on the Norfolk
coast of England. 34 The court excluded one Newtonian philosopher's 35 expert
testimony as a "matter of opinion, which could be no foundation for the verdict
of the jury."
36
On appeal, the case came before the now famous Lord Mansfield, Chief
Justice of the King's Bench.37 Lord Mansfield reversed the decision of the lower
court, finding the expert opinion proper evidence:
[T]he whole case is a question of opinion, from the facts agreed
upon.... It is objected that [the expert] is going to speak, not as
to facts, but as to opinion. That opinion, however, is deduced
from facts which are not disputed-the situation of banks, the
course of tides and winds, and the shifting of sands .... [The
expert] understands the construction of harbours [sic], the
causes of their destruction, and how remedied. In matters of
science no other witnesses can be called .... The question then
depends on the evidence of those who understand such matters;
and when such questions come before me, I always send for
some of the brethren of Trinity House. I cannot believe that
where the question is, whether a defect arises from a natural or
an artificial cause, the opinions of men of science are not to be
received.... The cause of the decay of the harbor is also a
matter of science, and still more so, whether the removal of the
bank can be beneficial. Of this, such men as [this expert] can
alone judge. Therefore we are of opinion that his judgment,
formed on facts, was very proper evidence.38
This decision by Lord Mansfield served as the backbone of expert testimony in
the Anglo-American legal system.39
33 Folkes v. Chadd (1782) 99 Eng. Rep. 589, 3 Doug. 157; see also Tal Golan, Revisiting the
History of Scientific Expert Testimony, 73 BROOK. L. REv. 879, 887 (2008).
34 Golan, supra note 33, at 887.
35 Newtonian philosophy involves the study of philosophy combined with experimental and
mathematical methods for the study of nature. See generally Andrew Janiak, Newton's Philosophy,
STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL., http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/newton-philosophy/ (last updated
May 6, 2014).
36 Golan, supra note 33, at 887 (quoting Folkes, 99 Eng. Rep. at 590).
37 Id. at 897.




West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 119, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 9
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol119/iss2/9
AN UNCIVIL ACTION
A. Case Law: Frye, Daubert, and Harper
While Americans were influenced by the rulings and admissibility
relating to experts in England, that influence did not actually set standards for
expert testimony in the United States. 40 The only requirement was that experts
be qualified to speak as experts who possess special training and experience in
the subject in question.41 Other qualifications and the admissibility of the expert's
testimony were left up to the judge.42 Furthermore, courts were not united on
whether experts could testify to the ultimate issue in a case, or rely on scientific
treatises.43 It was not until 1923 in Frye v. United States44 that a new standard
was born. The following section tracks the development of Frye's "general
acceptance" test and the Daubert test that superseded it, and sets forth the key
challenges facing Daubert's application today, including its markedly different
application in criminal and civil cases.
1. The Frye Test
James Frye was accused of murder and sought to introduce expert
testimony relating to a lie detector test (a systolic blood pressure test) at trial.45
The test asserted that the blood pressure of the test taker would change according
to the test taker's emotions.46 Mr. Frye's counsel offered the test designer as an
expert to discuss the results of the test, but the lower court denied tendering the
test designer as an expert.47 The appeals court affirmed this decision stating,
"while courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a
well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the
deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general
acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs. 48 What is known today as
the Frye test is simply expert testimony based on peer-review, principles and
methods generally accepted in the scientific community.49
40 Id. at 917 ("[N]either system was able to lay down a precise rule for determining who was
and who was not a competent expert.").
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 921-22.
44 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
45 Id. at 1013.
46 Id.
47 Id. at 1014.
48 Id.
49 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 584 (1993).
2016]
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Frye also happens to be one of the most vague and ambiguous decisions
in American jurisprudence. 50 The District of Columbia Court of Appeals
considered Frye's argument-that changes in blood pressure demonstrated
whether the test subject was prevaricating-but ultimately rejected the evidence
in cryptic fashion:
Just when a scientific principal or discovery crosses the line
between the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to
define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of
the principle must be recognized, and while courts will go a long
way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-
recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from
which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to
have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which
it belongs.5
The Frye court held that the expert's opinion must be derived from "a
thing," presumably to sufficiently remove pure opinion testimony. The "thing"
requirement is ostensibly related to the "well recognized scientific principle[s]
or discoverie[s]" of the previous sentence. To survive a challenge, the proposed
testimony must be established in "demonstrable" science, as opposed to that
which might be "experimental. 52
The Frye decision did not receive much traction and remained a sleeping
giant for several decades. From 1923 to 1948, only eight federal and five state
court criminal cases cited it.53 From 1948 to 1973, Frye was cited 55 times in
federal criminal cases and 29 times in state criminal cases.54 Coincidentally
(probably not), just before the adoption of the Rules in 1975, courts' citations to
Frye increased dramatically. 55 Nearly "every federal and state court addressing
the general acceptance standard adopted it."56
Nonetheless, Frye did not present itself in a civil case until 1984. 57
Interestingly, though the Supreme Court cast doubt on Frye's vitality in criminal
50 See Lyons, supra note 23.
51 A Simplified Guide to Forensic Evidence Admissibility & Expert Witnesses: The Frye
Standard, FORENSIC SCI. SIMPLIFIED, http://www.forensicsciencesimplified.org/legal/fiye.html
(last visited Nov. 3, 2016).
52 Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
53 David L. Faigman et al., Check Your Crystal Ball at the Door, Please: Exploring the Past,
Understanding the Present, and Worrying about the Future of Scientific Evidence, 15 CARDOZO L.
REv. 1799, 1808 n.25 (1994).
54 Id.
55 Id.
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cases, it never rendered a decision interpreting the Frye rule.58 Courts,
commentators, and legal scholars have been mystified by Frye and have
attempted to decode the true meaning of "general acceptance." 59 Others have had
difficulty defining the "particular field" or "relevant scientific community" that
determines if the "thing" is generally accepted.6°
Professor Paul Giannelli has summarized the arguments for and against
the Frye rule as a method for ensuring reliability of scientific evidence. 61 The
perceived benefit of Frye is that it confirms that those most qualified are the ones
who assess the general validity of a scientific method and that they carry "a
determinative voice., 62 The argument against using the Frye rule is that it may
frustrate or foreclose the use of innovative techniques. 63 At the very least, Frye
should promote uniformity as a singular, short rule, but the ongoing
interpretation of so few words essentially swallows any simplicity in its
formulation.
Thus, Frye leaves many questions unanswered. Who determines the
relevant scientific community? How does the court define the relevant scientific
community? Does the theory or technique cross into multiple disciplines, or is it
an emerging field? How mainstream should a theory or technique be before it
becomes relevant? Is there a way to quantify general acceptance? Must the
scientific community accept both the validity of an underlying theory and the
reliability of the technique? The proof of general acceptance is not
straightforward. How much weight do we give to scientific journals, treatises,
and other literature? When can courts take judicial notice, and should they? Is
Frye limited to "novel" scientific evidence or can it be expanded to all scientific
evidence? Rather than promote predictability and uniformity, the Frye test
became susceptible to inconsistent judicial application, manipulation, and
constant recalibration of Frye's elements.64
2. The Daubert Standard
Frye's shortcomings culminated in the decision by the Supreme Court
of the United States in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.65 Daubert
began as a trial about a birth defect allegedly caused by a prescription drug, but




61 Id.; see also Giannelli, supra note 6.
62 Lyons, supra note 23.
63 See id.
64 Id.
65 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
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courts.66 The expert testimony offered by the plaintiffs was based on unpublished
studies regarding causation between the drug and the birth defects, and the lower
court determined those studies fell short of the "general acceptance" standard set
out in Frye.67 But in the 70-year period between Daubert and Frye, the Rules
were adopted-particularly Rule 702-and the Court decided that the new rules
superseded the Frye test.68 The Daubert Court held that when federal courts
apply Rule 702 to expert testimony, the court should consider many factors in
assessing reliability, 69 and the judge's role in assessing these factors is to serve
as the gatekeeper of reliability and relevance. 70 The assessment is three-pronged:
(1) "courts are to consider the 'validity' or 'reliability' of the evidence in
question"; (2) "its degree of 'fit' to the facts and issues in the case"; and (3) "the
risks or dangers that the evidence will confuse the issues or mislead the jury. 7 1
In 1999, the Court expanded Daubert to all expert testimony, not just scientific
testimony, in Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael.72
But this decision left a gaping hole as to what evidentiary standard
should succeed Frye. The Court said Rule 702 "clearly contemplates some
degree of regulation" of the content of expert testimony and an assessment of its
reliability. The expert is limited to his or her "scientific... knowledge. 73
Quoting Webster's Dictionary, the Court said knowledge "applies to any body
of known facts or any body of ideas inferred from such facts or accepted as truths
on good grounds. '74 It also quoted from the amicus curia brief of the American
Association for the Advancement of Science and the National Academy of
Sciences (the same National Academy of Sciences that would later release the
66 Id. at 582.
67 Id. at 583-84.
68 Id. at 588 ("Nothing in the text of this Rule establishes 'general acceptance' as an absolute
prerequisite to admissibility."); see also FED. R. EVID. 702 (1975) (amended 2011) ("If scientific,
technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or
to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.").
69 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94. The court provided a non-exclusive list of ways to determine
whether the evidence is reliable: (1) "whether it can be (and has been) tested"; (2) "whether the
theory or technique has been subject to peer review and publication"; (3) "the known or potential
rate of error"; (4) general acceptance in the community; and (5) "the existence and maintenance of
standards controlling the technique's operation." Id.
70 Id. at 597.
71 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 7:10 (4th ed.
2015).
72 See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999) ("We conclude that Daubert's
general holding-setting forth the trial judge's general 'gatekeeping' obligation-applies not only
to testimony based on 'scientific' knowledge, but also to testimony based on 'technical' and 'other
specialized' knowledge."); see also MUELLER & KMKPATRICK, supra note 71.
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scathing report on the state of the forensic science): "Science ... represents a
process for proposing and refining theoretical explanations about the world that
are subject to further testing and refinement."75 Therefore, scientific knowledge
is an assertion or inference derived by the scientific method.
76
The Court noted Rule 702 requires that expert testimony "assist the trier
of fact."" This language "goes primarily to relevance," and the Court adopted
Judge Edward R. Becker's description of this as a "fit" requirement.78 Scientific
testimony might be fit for some purposes but not others. 79 For example, bullet
wounds in a body may be valid scientific evidence about where the perpetrator
was standing, but not about whether two people were holding that gun at the
same time when the weapon was fired.8" The Court also observed that the Rule
702 "helpfulness" standard requires a defensible scientific nexus to the relevant
issue."
To assist in the determination of the underlying methodology's scientific
validity and applicability to the case, the Court provided four nonexclusive
"factors" for guidance. 82 The Daubert criteria mirror the factors articulated in
United States v. Williams 83 and United States v. Downing84:
(1) Whether the expert's theory or technique can be (and has
been) tested;
(2) Whether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer
review and publication;
(3) Whether the theory or technique has an acceptable known
or potential rate of error and the existence and maintenance
of standards controlling the technique's operation; and
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 591.
78 Id.
79 See id.
80 In Mississippi, 13-year-old Tyler Edmonds was tried and convicted (along with his sister)
for the murder of his brother-in-law. Joneil Adriano, Pathologist's Work Raises Questions, CNN:
ANDERSON COOPER 360 (Aug. 21, 2009, 10:00 PM)
http://ac360.blogs.cnn.com/2009/08/2 1/pathologists-work-raises-questions/. The medical
examiner claimed to be able to determine from the bullet wounds that Edmonds had been holding
the gun simultaneously with his sister at the time the trigger was pulled. Id. On appeal to the
Mississippi Supreme Court, this testimony was called "speculative" and "scientifically unfounded"
by the court. Upon retrial in 2008, absent that testimony, Edmonds was acquitted. Id.
81 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591-92. The Court did not explain why it was necessary to incorporate
a relevance standard into Rule 702 in addition to that in Rules 401-03.
82 Id. at 593-94.
83 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir. 1978).
84 753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985).
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(4) Whether the theory or technique has attained "general
acceptance. 85
The Court explained that peer review and publication, while not
"dispositive," are relevant.8 6 Moreover, a "known technique which has been able
to attract only minimal support within the [relevant scientific] community" may
be viewed skeptically. 87
In defining the role of the judge, the Court assigned a "gatekeeping"
function: "[t]he trial judge must ensure that any and all scientific testimony or
85 Id. Note that on remand, the Ninth Circuit added a fifth Daubert factor that did not make it
into Rule 702. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1317 (9th Cir. 1995).
As the Ninth Circuit described it, the fifth factor for testing the reliability of expert testimony "is
whether the experts are proposing to testify about matters growing naturally and directly out of
research they have conducted independent of the litigation, or whether they have developed their
opinions expressly for purposes of testifying." Id. This factor examines "the impartiality or
neutrality of the expert," and whether "outside of the world of litigation," the expert or the industry
has recognized the methodology. Id. at 1317-18. The thought here is that an expert whose findings
flow from existing research or other work in a field is less likely to be biased toward a particular
conclusion by a fee. Id. at 1317. In criminal cases that actually entertain a more thorough Daubert
application, this factor is often left in the dust. One federal court described this factor as one of the
two primary criteria for establishing the reliability of scientific expert testimony. Lauzon v. Seneco
Prods., Inc., 270 F.3d 681 (8th Cir. 2001). Yet in forensic science, it is thought to have limited
application sciences because the techniques do not have any nonjudicial applications.
But this is actually a very important factor in forensic science cases. The issue is not the fee,
but the contextual bias. Within the inherent subjectivity of forensic science comes a certain level
of influence from "contextual" surroundings. Many factors could create such a context around the
examiner's analysis. Forensic experts-including fingerprint examiners-often have access to
information surrounding a case that goes outside of the realm of information needed to conduct
their forensic analysis. This includes details about the crime and the suspect, such as prior
convictions or social affiliations or even that the potential fingerprint match is critical as it will be
the only strong evidence in the case.
This confirmation bias is the likely result of a mixture of peer pressure-in that the original
examiner is likely someone they know in the field-and expectation bias. See generally Itiel E.
Dror et al., Contextual Information Renders Experts Vulnerable to Making Erroneous
Identifications, 156 FORENSIC SCI INT'L 74 (2006). There are no current procedures to protect
examiners from receiving extraneous contextual information that could have an unconscious
influence on the examiner's findings. Id.
Moreover, during the verification stage (such as in fingerprint examination) in which the
additional examiner determines the appropriateness of a decision is when confirmation or
contextual bias may occur. See Jennifer L. Mnookin, The Courts, the NAS, and the Future of
Forensic Science, 75 BROOK. L. REv. 1209, 1218 (2010). In the majority of laboratories, the
verification step is conducted by an examiner who is both informed of the original examiner's
conclusion before even beginning their own analysis and the facts surrounding the case. Id. The
verifying examiner usually understands that they are verifying a conclusion reached by another
examiner that they usually know and that the conclusion the first examiner came to was that the
prints were a match. Id.
86 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594.
87 Id. (quoting United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1238 (3d Cir. 1985)).
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evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable." 88 This requires "a
preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the
testimony is scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning or methodology
properly can be applied to the facts" of the case. 89 This preliminary assessment
is what I call the three-footed stool of reliability: (1) is the method reliable? (2)
was it reliably applied to this particular case; and (3) is this expert a reliable
expert? Knock one of them out and the stool tumbles.
The Court also addressed two collateral concerns raised by interested
parties.90 Some worried that rejecting Frye's general acceptance test would result
in a "free-for-all" of "absurd and irrational pseudoscientific assertions." 91 The
Court was sure that effective cross-examination, presentations of contrary
evidence, pre-trial motions, and proper jury instructions will refute "shaky but
admissible evidence. 92 Here is where the Court's logic is flawed: Relying on the
adversary nature of a trial to identify and undermine unreliable science should
never be a solution to a problem. And the notion that a court would dispose of
scientifically unsupported cases under Rules 56 or 50(a) before they get to the
jury is fantastic, except that you cannot do that in a criminal case.93
The Court rejected the concerns of the petitioners and certain amici that
the gatekeeping role for the trial judge will "sanction a stifling and repressive
scientific orthodoxy" and be "inimical to the search for truth., 94 The Court said
there are important differences between the quests for truth in the courtroom and
in the laboratory. 95 Science may benefit from hypotheses that ultimately prove
incorrect. 96 "Conjectures that are probably wrong are of little use, however, in
the project of reaching a quick, final, and binding legal judgment-often of great
consequence-about a particular set of events in the past., 97 The Court
characterized this as the balance struck by the Rules. 98 It reversed and remanded
because the district court and circuit court had focused almost exclusively on the
"general acceptance" standard.99
88 Id. at 589.
89 Id. at 592-93.
90 Id. at 595.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 596.
93 FED. R. Civ. P. 50(a), 56.
94 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596.
95 Id. at 596-97.
96 Id. at 597.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Id. at 597-98.
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Chief Justice William Rehnquist wrote an opinion concurring in part and
dissenting in part, in which an unlikely ally, Justice John Paul Stevens, joined. 100
Chief Justice Rehnquist agreed that the Federal Rules served as Frye's death
sentence, but he objected to the majority's criteria as "vague and abstract"-
criticism that would apply equally to Frye.10' Rehnquist concluded with concerns
over whether trial judges would become "amateur scientists" in order to comport
with their gatekeeping duties.10
2
Rehnquist issued an important caution given that there are concerns
about how much training judges and lawyers should receive on science. The
Federal Judicial Center publishes an excellent Reference Manual on Scientific
Evidence'0 3 and the NAS Report called for education for the judiciary and
attorney components of the criminal justice system.'04
This is not to say that Daubert is the second coming. Comparing Frye to
Daubert, the decisions do have common ground beyond "general acceptance."' 5
One helpful aspect of Frye was its deference to the consensus of the scientific
community to reach reliability. 106 Frye also intended to allow valid scientific
evidence and exclude the "experimental.' ' 07 Daubert perhaps injected
unforeseen (and unending) debate as to the testability, error rate, and existence
of standards pertaining to a scientific theory or technique. But scientific evidence
must be reliable-that's the bedrock of Rule 702.108 If this is to mean excluding
"authentic insights and innovations," then it should apply with equal force to the
science we deem familiar but that is otherwise the product of subjective
interpretation, such as forensic science.0 9
3. Even Daubert Has Its Flaws
Admittedly, Daubert presents its own snags in the application. If science
is, as the Court quotes, "a process for proposing and refining theoretical
explanations about the world that are subject to further testing and refinement,"
then testability, error rate, standards, and peer review reflect the accord of the
scientific community in accepting that the theory or technique is valid."0 The
100 Id. at 598 (Rehnquist, C. J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
101 Id.
102 Id. at 600-01.
103 See FED. JUDICIAL CENT., REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE (2011).
104 See NAS REPORT, supra note 2.
105 See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
106 Id. at 1014.
107 Id. at 1013.
108 FED. R. EVID. 702(c).
109 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993).
110 Id. at 590.
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Carnegie Commission on Science, Technology, and Government, which
submitted an amicus brief in Daubert, noted that "for a theory on which an expert
relies to be deemed 'scientific' (1) it must set forth a hypothesis that is capable
of being proven false through observation or experiment, and (2) the data
produced through this testing must be capable of replication." '' In addition, the
American Association for the Advancement of Science and the National
Academy of Sciences in their own amici brief said: "A new theory or explanation
must generally survive a period of testing, review, and refinement before
achieving scientific acceptance. This process does not merely reflect the
scientific method; it is the scientific method."' 12 Sixteen years later, the NAS
Report would return to that exact premise.'
3
The Daubert factors-while neither exclusive nor exhaustive-are
interdependent criteria. 114 If a scientific theory is testable, has a known error rate,
and is subjected to professional standards and peer review, then the general
scientific community should accept it." 5 This makes sense. A theory may
ultimately flunk the general acceptance factor even if it meets the others. For
example, we can have a hypothesis that the sun revolves around the earth. This
is testable, would be subject to peer review, and would have a 100% error rate.
But, at the end of the day, it is just plain nonsense. Similarly, a theory may not
meet the other Daubert criteria, but it may achieve general acceptance. Take hair
microscopy or bite mark analysis. Both have been under fire as a means of
identification, but for decades they were generally accepted valid means of a
positive identification.' 16 Thus, the scientific community that has embraced the
theory may well be just a biased group of partisans.
Much like Frye, the "flexibility" of the Daubert factors makes them
vulnerable to manipulation. This largely is a construct of civil cases, but that does
not mean it has not happened in criminal cases." 7 Just about any scientific article
can likely find a home for publication, so one has to probe deeply to determine
the rigors of the peer review. Moreover, accreditations and certifications are no
guarantee of proficiency. An expert must be thoroughly vetted because,
III Brief of Carnegie Commission on Science, Technology, & Government as Amici Curiae
Supporting Neither Party, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 869 (1995) (No. 92-
102).
112 Brief of American Ass'n for the Advancement of Science & the National Academy of
Sciences as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509
U.S. 869 (1995) (No. 92-102).
113 NAS REPORT, supra note 2.
114 See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 579.
115 Id.
116 See, e.g., Spencer S. Hsu, FBI Admits Flaws in Hair Analysis over Decades, WASH. POST
(Apr. 18, 2015), https://washingtonpost.com/local/crime/fbi-overstated-forensic-hair-matches-in-
nearly-all-criminal-trials-for-decades/2015/04/18/39c8d8c6-e515-11 e4-b5 10-
962fcfabc3 1 0story.html.
117 See Lyons, supra note 23.
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ultimately, what a judge or jury hears can sound incredibly impressive even if its
all poppycock. This requires thorough investigation on the part of the attorneys-
but it is an advantage Daubert permits that Frye necessarily does not. For
example, let us look at fingerprint analysis. The process of forensic fingerprint
identification fails to meet the peer review and publication standards.118 The
published literature on fingerprinting is overwhelmingly about how to classify
sets of 10 inked fingerprints; how to chemically process and otherwise "develop"
(that is, make visible) latent fingerprints; and how friction ridges are formed
during embryonic development.1 19 These topics are of marginal relevance to the
method of forensic fingerprint identification.
Testability presents challenges as well. A shortcoming of Daubert is that
it merely requires that the theory be "testable," not that it actually be tested.
Returning to fingerprint identification: the fingerprint community has yet to
develop an adequate standard for what constitutes a fingerprint "match."12 It is
well understood that similarities in location, type, and orientation of what are
called "ridge characteristics" lead fingerprint examiners to conclude that a print
(be it patent or latent) and an inked print from a known source come from the
same finger.
121
It is difficult-and perhaps currently impossible-to test how many of
these similarities, or to what degree of similarity, warrants this conclusion.
Different examiners will arrive at different ideas about the characteristics they
have in agreement and how many of those are sufficient for an identification. 122
It should be noted that this conclusion does not have a probability attached to it.
Rather it is presented as an unqualified opinion that there is a "match" or an
"identification" between a known print and an unknown print does not come
close to being standardized. Such a statement asserted as fact is one that has never
been established as true on the basis of any kind of empirical testing or rigorous
theory. The use of the term "match" or "uniqueness" has never been
demonstrated to be true, and remains unsupported by any scientific testing, but
believed nonetheless. Thus, one might guess that fingerprint examination would
fail a Daubert analysis. It does not, but there have been several close calls. 123
The dearth of testable research and empirical evidence on fingerprint
identification can lead us to conclude that: (1) there is no clearly articulated
standard for what constitutes a fingerprint match, and (2) the standard, whatever
118 See Jennifer L. Mnookin, The Validity of Latent Fingerprint Identification: Confessions of
a Fingerprinting Moderate, 7 LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK, no. 2, at 127, 129 (2008).
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 Fingerprint, in WORLD OF FORENSIC SCIENCE 293 (K. Lee Lerner & Brenda Wilmoth Lerner
eds., 2005).
122 Id. at 294-95.
123 See generally United States v. Llera Plaza, 188 F. Supp. 2d 549 (E.D. Pa. 2002); United
States v. Merritt, No. IP 01-081-R-01, 2002 WL 1821821, at *1 (S.D. Ind. June 26, 2002).
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it is, is not uniform, across the United States, and around the world. Daubert is
applicable to not only "scientific" testimony, but to all expert testimony, which
includes the technical applications of forensic science. 124 The criminal justice
system should permit Daubert to exist in practice so as "to make certain that an
expert, whether basing testimony upon professional studies or personal
experience, employs in the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that
characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field., 125 Daubert's
reliability standards require more than merely "taking the expert's word for it,"
which currently carries a lot of weight when the subject is forensic science.
126
Daubert requires greater scrutiny of all expert testimony to safeguard cases from
junk science and unreliable opinion testimony. 1
27
Because Daubert hearings for criminal cases tend to receive short
shrift, 128 it is apparently sufficient that the expert witness say his theory is testable
without an actual requirement that it be tested (i.e., no two fingerprints are alike).
By its language, Daubert should require substantial testing by independent
entities not involved in the forensic process. 129 Moreover, what evidence of an
error rate of standards demonstrates reliability? Who verifies the error rate or
establishes the standards?
This Daubert dichotomy cannot be ignored. I agree that expert evidence
in civil cases takes on a markedly different scope-causation testimony becomes
the crux of the case and deep-pocket corporate defendants have the time, money,
and an abundance of attorneys to do everything possible to pick the scientific
evidence apart piece by piece. The same cannot be said of an underfunded and
overworked prosecutor or criminal defense attorney. They barely keep their
heads above water, and they lack the time and energy to argue over source
attribution in Daubert hearings. Bottom line: scientific evidence in criminal and
civil cases receives markedly different treatment. But does it have to be? The
federal system makes it different in practice. The Georgia system makes it
different by statute and case law.
124 See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147 (1999).
125 Id. at 152.
126 FED. R. EVID. 702, advisory committee notes.
127 See generally Lyons, supra note 23.
128 See D. Michael Risinger, Navigating Expert Reliability: Are Criminal Standards of
Certainty Being Left on the Dock?, 64 ALA. L. REv. 99, 104-05 (2000) (Between the Daubert
opinion and 2000, there were 649 federal district court Daubert opinions; 584 of those opinions
were in non-criminal cases).
129 Gabel, supra note 17, at 339-40.
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4. Georgia's Harper Standard
Peer review and general acceptance became known as the Frye test,
which held its place in the courts (federal and state) for many years.130 In 1982,
this changed in the state of Georgia during the murder trial Harper v. State.131
The defendant Michael Earl Harper was convicted and sentenced to life in prison
for the murder of George Mercer, IV.132 At the trial level, the defendant sought
to offer expert testimony from a psychiatrist but was denied. 133 The trial court
denied the testimony because the psychiatrist's testing methods were not
established as reliable. 134 On appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court upheld the
decision to exclude the expert's opinion, even if it had been peer reviewed and
accepted in the scientific community. 35 The Georgia court stated:
After much consideration, we conclude that the Frye rule of
"counting heads" in the scientific community is not an
appropriate way to determine the admissibility of a scientific
procedure .... We hold that it is proper for the trial judge to
decide whether the procedure or technique in question has
reached a scientific stage of verifiable certainty.... whether the
procedure "rests upon the laws of nature." . . . The significant
point is that the trial court makes this determination based on the
evidence available to him rather than by simply calculating the
consensus in the scientific community. 
136
This is certainly vulnerable to the same vagaries and attempts at interpretation as
Frye.137 What is unique about Georgia is that while it has a dedicated rule of
evidence on scientific evidence in criminal cases, some reported opinions still
cite Harper, and the language of the statute versus the case is incongruous.
1 38
Unlike the federal courts, where Daubert is embedded in Federal Rule 702,
Georgia does not fold Harper into Official Code of Georgia Annotated
130 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 71.
131 See generally Harper v. State, 292 S.E.2d 389 (Ga. 1982).
132 Id. at 391.
133 Id. at 394. The opinion from the psychiatrist was based on an interview the psychiatrist had
with the defendant, while the defendant was under the influence of sodium amytal, a "truth serum."
Id. Outside the presence of the jury, the psychiatrist testified that he gave the defendant this serum
"to find the truth" and that use of this "truth serum" was an "accepted medical and psychiatric
technique." Id.
134 Id.
135 Id. at 396.
136 Id. at 395-96.
137 See generally Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
138 See Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. v. Tvrdeich, 602 S.E.2d 297, 299 (Ga. 2004).
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("O.C.G.A.") section 24-7-707.' Instead, they exist in separate silos and may
or may not be referenced in a case. Having two separate rules operating at one
time creates a "hit or miss" approach that makes it difficult to assess how Harper
is used.
5. Florida and the Frye Years (Pre-2013)
At least West Virginia and Florida have one rule operating at one time.
West Virginia's rule is statutory, 140 while Florida's is based on case law."'
Florida's scientific evidence standard currently exists in a state of purgatory, but
there are some defined lines. Pre-2013, the standard is Frye.142 Post-2013, it is
Daubert. Post-2016, it could be back to Frye. Florida adopted the Frye standard
in 1985 in Bundy v. State,143 the prosecution of the infamous serial killer, Ted
Bundy. In reiterating Frye, the Florida Supreme Court stated that "the concerns
surrounding the reliability of hypnosis warrant a holding that this mechanism,
like polygraph and truth serum results, has not been proven sufficiently reliable
by experts in the field to justify its validity as competent evidence in a criminal
trial.", 1
44
And with one fell swoop, Frye became the standard in Florida trial
courts. 145 But its application was limited to expert opinions based upon new or
novel scientific techniques. 146 In applying the Frye test, Florida courts were
instructed to scrutinize expert testimony, scientific and legal writings, as well as
judicial opinions to determine whether the new or novel scientific techniques had
gained the requisite general acceptance in the field.147
Florida courts developed a body of case law for its use and application.
The court in U.S. Sugar Corp. v. Henson recognized that Frye receives narrow
application and that the "vast majority" of cases do not require an analysis.1 48 For
its part, the Florida Supreme Court has repeatedly declared that pure opinion
testimony is not subject to the Frye test. 149 Unfortunately, aspects of forensic
testimony can stray into pure opinion.
139 GA. CODE ANN. § 24-7-707 (2016).
140 See discussion infra Part I.B.4.
141 See Bundy v. State, 471 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1985).
142 Id.
143 Id.
144 Id. at 18.
145 Id.
146 U.S. Sugar Corp. v. Henson, 823 So. 2d 104, 109 (Fla. 2002).
147 Flanagan v. State, 625 So. 2d 827, 828 (Fla. 1993).
148 Henson, 823 So. 2d at 109; see also Rickgauer v. Sarkar, 804 So. 2d 502, 504 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2001) ("Most expert testimony is not subject to the Frye test.").
149 See Marsh v. Valyou, 977 So. 2d 543, 548 (Fla. 2007) (it is well-established that Frye is
inapplicable to "pure opinion" testimony); Flanagan, 625 So. 2d at 828 (commenting that "pure
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This was evident in the Florida Supreme Court's Ramirez opinions. 5 °
Dade County prosecutors have repeatedly won convictions against Joseph
Ramirez for the Christmas Eve 1983 robbery and murder of a 27-year-old
Federal Express courier who was stabbed to death. 151 At Ramirez's first trial,
Robert Hart, a criminalist at the Metro-Dade Police Department, factored as the
state's star witness.'52 Hart testified that he had compared a knife (recovered from
the car of Ramirez's girlfriend) to striations found on a wound left in the victim's
rib cartilage. 5 3 Hart testified to a "scientific certainty" that he could conclude
that Ramirez's knife-and only Ramirez's knife-made the one-half inch mark
on the victim's cartilage. 54 Ramirez received the death penalty. 55
While other evidence existed that implicated Ramirez, the knife
testimony was particularly critical. 156 On appeal, the Florida Supreme Court
ordered a new trial, declaring Hart's testimony was "self-serving" and
scientifically unreliable. 157 At the second trial, Hart testified at a pre-trial hearing
that his identification theory was reliable and presented an article he had written
about it.158 The judge prevented Ramirez from presenting any opposing evidence,
and with Hart's testimony ruled admissible, Ramirez was convicted and
sentenced to death once more.
1 59
To its credit, the Florida Supreme Court again reversed the conviction
and held that Ramirez had been denied a fair hearing on the admissibility of the
knife evidence. 160 Another hearing was held to determine the reliability of the
evidence under Frye.161 After the state presented six experts supporting Hart and
the defense presented one expert debunking Hart, the judge allowed Hart to
testify a third time, yet again. 162 Ramirez again received a death sentence.
63
Take three at the Florida Supreme Court: it reversed, concluding that
Hart's identification procedure "cannot be said to carry the imprimatur of
opinion testimony ... does not have to meet Frye, because this type of testimony is based on the
expert's personal experience and training").
150 See Ramirez v. State, 810 So. 2d 836, 844 (Fla. 2001).
151 Id. at 839.
152 Id.
153 Id. at 848.
154 Id.
155 Id. at 839.
156 See id. at 848.









West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 119, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 9
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol119/iss2/9
AN UNCIVIL ACTION
science."' 164 The court concluded "that this testimony standing alone is
insufficient to establish admissibility under Frye in light of the fact that Hart's
testing procedure possesses none of the hallmarks of acceptability that apply in
the relevant scientific community to this type of evidence., 165 In a nod to
Daubert, the court also observed that Hart's methodology, "and particularly his
claim of infallibility," lacked any scientific testing or meaningful peer review.'1 66
The Florida Supreme Court termed it "a classic example of the kind of novel
'scientific' evidence that Frye was intended to banish-i.e., a subjective,
untested, unverifiable identification procedure that purports to be infallible., 167
To emphasize its point, the Florida Supreme Court ruled that Ramirez could no
longer be sentenced to death if tried a fourth time. 168 The prosecution did proceed
with a fourth trial-this time with shaky shoeprint evidence-and finally won
their conviction.
169
The Hart testimony essentially amounted to pure opinion about both his
confidence in the conclusions and also his capabilities. Testimony like Hart's is
unique in that it was kept out of the case. The pure opinion exception (to the
Florida Evidence Rules' general bar on opinion testimony) provides that so long
as an expert's opinion relies on the expert's personal experience and training and
avoids discussion of any scientific method, then the testimony is admissible
without judicial scrutiny.1 70 As the NAS Report noted, many courts "affirm
admissibility citing earlier decisions rather than facts established at a hearing. ' 171
And so, "while cloaked with the credibility of the expert, this testimony is
analyzed by the jury as it analyzes any other personal opinion or factual
testimony by a witness. 172
164 Id. at 853.
165 Id. at 849.
166 Id.
167 Id. at 853.
168 Id.
169 David Ovalle, Killer of Miami FedEx Delivery Woman Heads to Parole Hearing, MIAMI
HERALD (Dec. 1, 2015, 6:00 PM),
http://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/crime/article47409150.html. The prosecutors in this case
seem particularly hungry for a conviction. At a "fourth trial in 2007, prosecutors introduced a
photograph of carpeting from the crime scene" and a detective testified that a "mark on the carpet
was the 'same' as the defendant's shoeprint." Gabe, Forensic Failures, CRIME REP. (May 19,
2009), thecrimereport.org/2009/05/19/forensic-failure/. Ramirez was convicted again. Id. "In the
defense motion that prompted the order for an evidentiary hearing [on the shoeprint], William
Bodziak, a former FBI agent and nationally recognized" shoeprint expert, "declared that the mark
in a photograph of the carpet is not even identifiable as a shoeprint, but only as 'faint reddened
areas, possibly including some linear areas or lines."' Id. Nonetheless, the conviction remained
intact and Ramirez would later end up at parole hearing in December 2015. Ovalle, supra.
70 Flanagan v. State, 625 So. 2d 827, 828 (Fla. 1993).
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B. Codified Evidence
While Federal Rule 702 draws no distinction between criminal and civil
cases,173 in some states, this Daubert disparity is far more omnipresent-not only
in practice but also in the actual state Evidence Code. States will occasionally
debate, consider, and sometimes even adopt the federal rules for civil cases.
Daubert/Federal Rule 702, however, always receives stiff resistance in criminal
cases, as evidenced by Florida and Georgia's reluctance to adopt it.174 Whether
a function of the comfort factor or a strong lobbying effort from prosecutors and
others, the status quo persists. Consequently, a patchwork quilt of admissibility
endures, and untested forensic science receives a "free pass" in criminal cases.
The following section describes the development of Federal Rule 702
and highlights the inconsistencies between admissibility standards for expert
witness testimony across states. Three states from across the admissibility
spectrum serve as comparison tools to the federal system: Florida, Georgia, and
West Virginia. The examples underscore the reality that the admissibility of
scientific expert evidence in criminal cases is all over the map.
1. The Federal Rules of Evidence
As mentioned above, the Frye test was created before the Rules were
enacted.1 75 President Ford signed the Rules into law in 1975 after years of
redrafts and decades of attempts to create them. 176 The first version of Rule 702
stated: "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier
of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education,
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. 17 7 Notably, the Frye
test is mentioned nowhere in the Rule, the Advisory Committee notes, or the
legislative history of drafting the rule.1 78 The Daubert court noted this and
decided that the Rules govern expert testimony, not the old Frye test.
1 79
173 See generally FED. R. EvID. 702.
174 See Alex Cuello & Stephanie Villavicencio, Adoption of Daubert in the Amendment to F.S.
§ 90.702 Tightens the Rules for the Admissibility of Expert Witness Testimony, FLA. B.J., no. 8,
Sept.-Oct. 2014, at 1, 38.
175 See supra Part I.
176 Eileen A. Scallen, Analyzing "The Politics of [Evidence] Rulemaking", 53 HASTINGS L.J.
843, 854 (2002).
177 FED. R. EviD. 702 (1975).
178 Id.
179 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993).
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Rule 702 was not amended until 2000 to codify the Daubert standard.1 80
The amendment merely extended the Rule by adding the qualifications still in
place today.18 1 It was further amended in 2011 as part of a holistic attempt to
make the Rules of Evidence easier to understand.1 82 Today, Federal Rule 702
provides:
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an
opinion or otherwise if:
(a) the expert's scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence
or to determine a fact in issue;
(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;
(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and
methods; and
(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to
the facts of the case.
1 83
Even though Rule 702 controls and includes Daubert, the pre-trial motion is still
titled "Daubert Hearing" rather than a "702 Hearing." Daubert hearings are
common in civil cases such as toxic torts claims, medical malpractice actions,
and product liability cases where causation evidence requires expert testimony.
In federal criminal cases, Daubert hearings are perhaps gaining some ground due
to the NAS Report, which created some vulnerability for forensic evidence and
opened the door to defense challenges. 84
2. The Florida Rules of Evidence
Florida serves as the base line Frye state and also provides a perfect lens
through which to view the battle to adopt Rule 702. Florida employed Frye as its
standard until 2013, when it detoured to Daubert, but now it seems poised to
revert back to Frye.185 The yo-yo began in 2006 (and perhaps earlier) with an
180 Compare FED. R. EvID. 702 (1993) ("If scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge
will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto
in the form of an opinion or otherwise."), with FED. R. EVID. 702 (2000).
181 FED. R. EviD. 702 (2000).
182 FED. R. EVID. 702 (2011).
183 FED. R. EVID. 702 (2015).
184 See NAS REPORT, supra note 2.
185 David A. Jones, Frye v. Daubert-Time to Bring Florida into the 21st Century, FLA. B.
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effort by the Florida Legislature to mandate a change from Frye to Daubert 86
In 2013, a Daubert bill passed and tracks verbatim Federal Rule of Evidence
702.187 Importantly, the bill included a legislative statement of intent to prohibit
"pure opinion" testimony. 188 But the opinion language is not in the actual text of
the statute. The bill became effective July 1, 2013, and Florida courts have begun
using the new standard, pending Florida Supreme Court review.189 Thus, it is not
yet reflected in the Florida Rules of Evidence.'
90
By moving to Daubert and adopting Rule 702 in 2013, Florida has
experienced two years with a statutory scientific evidence standard. The reported
opinions are sparse (and if the Florida Supreme Court retains Frye, they will be
void), but there are some appellate level opinions tackling the applicability of the
Daubert standard in Florida.1 91 In Perez v. Bell South,1 92 the Third District Court
of Appeal of Florida affirmed the exclusion of an expert's testimony under the
Daubert standard, providing the first in-depth appellate treatment of the Daubert
standard in Florida. 
193
The case involved a plaintiffs claim that stressful work conditions
caused her to suffer a placental abruption and deliver her child 20 weeks early. 1
94
The plaintiff offered the testimony of an obstetrician/gynecologist, who testified
that in his experience "there may very well be a correlation between placental
186 Id. Tort reform proponents supported Daubert, but the shift was widely opposed by
plaintiffs' personal injury, access to justice advocates, and Florida prosecutors. Id.
187 Id.
188 Stephen E. Mahle, The "Pure Opinion" Exception to the Florida Frye Standard, FLA. B.J.,
no. 2, Feb. 2012, at 41, 41,
https://www.floridabar.org/divcom/jn/jnjoumal01 .nsf/c0d73 1 e03de9828d852574580042ae7a/00
d34c3a5532 1 f4a852579a0005baa1b!OpenDocument&Highlight-0.
189 Id.; Jones, supra note 185.
190 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.702 (West 2013). "Although the new statute has already become
operative in Florida Courts," the Florida Supreme Court must ultimately determine rules of
evidence under the Florida Constitution. See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 2; Fla. Bar Trial Lawyer's
Section, Draft White Paper on Frye/Daubert (Oct. 26, 2015) (hereinafter Draft White Paper),
https://www.floridabar.org/TFB/TFBResources.nsf/Attachments/608D69B4133F937B85257EE
A004F54A7/$FILE/DAUBERT%2ODraft%/ 20for%20FL%2OBarl 0.26.15.pdf?OpenElement. At
the time of writing this Article, the Florida Supreme Court is currently considering adoption of an
evidence rule to reflect the new statute. Id. "In the meantime, Florida trial courts have begun to
implement the Daubert standard," with the caveat that it is pending Florida Supreme Court review.
Id.
191 See generally Perez v. Bell So. Telecomms., Inc., 138 So. 3d 492 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
192 Id.
193 Id. at 498.
194 Id. at 494-95.
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abruption and stress. 195 Nonetheless, the expert also admitted that scientific
research did not support this opinion.
196
The trial court excluded the expert's testimony under Frye (which
applied at the time), which left the plaintiff with no proof of causation.1 97 On
appeal, the plaintiff argued that the expert's testimony was "pure opinion"
testimony, which Frye would let in.198 During the pendency of appeal, the Florida
Legislature amended Florida's Evidence Code, specifically section 90.702, to
incorporate the Daubert standard.1 99
The Third District Court of Appeals of Florida definitely concluded that
90.702 controlled when Florida changed "from a Frye jurisdiction to a Daubert
jurisdiction. '200 Importantly, the court noted that "[t]he legislative purpose of the
new law is clear: to tighten the rules for admissibility of expert testimony in the
courts of this state."2 0 According to the legislature's expressed intent, the Third
District explained that the Daubert standard, as "reaffirmed and refined" by the
Joiner and Kumho Tire cases, applies "to all expert testimony," not just medical
202expert testimony. Consequently, the "general acceptance" of a scientific
theory in the community remains one of many factors a court should consider
under the Daubert standard, but that factor on its own "is no longer a sufficient
basis for the admissibility of expert testimony.,
20 3
The appellate court also clarified the legislative intent in barring "pure
opinion" testimony. Even though Frye previously allowed pure opinions, the
court drew a bright line: "Subjective belief and unsupported speculation are
henceforth inadmissible. 20 4 Finally, in addressing the retroactivity of Daubert,
the court determined that it "indisputably applies retrospectively" because it was
a procedural change to the evidence rules rather than one of substantive law.
205
For support, the court underscored that other courts of appeal in Florida had
reached the same result.20 6 Ultimately, the court affirmed the judgment in favor
of the employer because the methodology employed by the expert did not meet
the relevance and reliability standards set forth in Daubert and its progeny.20 7
195 Id. at 496.
196 Id.
197 Id. at 493.
198 Id. at 496.
199 FLA. STAT. § 90.702 (2013).
200 Perez, 138 So. 3d at 497.
201 Id. (emphasis added).
202 Id.
203 Id. at 498-99.
204 Id. at 499.
205 Id. at 498.
206 See id.; see also Conley v. State, 129 So. 3d 1120, 1121 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013).
207 Perez, 138 So. 3d at 499.
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Of course, that opinion may have zero bearing moving forward. But it is
telling that the appellate court again reinforced that "general acceptance" is not
enough. With the impending Florida Supreme Court review, a battle ensued at
the end of 2015 to keep Daubert out of Florida.2 °8 As of December 2015, the
Florida Bar Board of Governors recommended to the Florida Supreme Court that
it retain the Frye standard.209
3. The Georgia Rules of Evidence
Georgia created an evidence code more quickly than the federal courts
and by the 1860s Georgia had a "Code of Practice. '210 Like the federal court
system, Georgia too had one standard for experts through case law and another
through the Official Code of Georgia ("Georgia Code").211 Originally, the
Georgia Code made no distinction between expert testimony in criminal cases
and expert testimony in civil cases.212 For years the Georgia rule on expert
testimony merely stated: "The opinions of experts on any question of science,
skill, trade, or like questions shall always be admissible; and such opinions may
be given on the facts as proved by other witnesses., 213
This remained the statutory standard until the 2005 Tort Reform Act,
which changed the standard for civil cases, but not criminal.214 Specifically,
Georgia adopted the Daubert standard for civil cases, leaving the rules governing
expert testimony in criminal cases untouched.215 This adaptation left experts
testifying in Georgia criminal cases not only subject to a different evidence rule,
but also an entirely different case law standard. By the end of the twentieth
century, Georgia considered adopting the Rules, but did not officially do so until
2013.216
208 See Jones, supra note 185.
209 Julie Kay, Florida Bar Board Votes to Keep Frye Expert Witness Standard, DAILY Bus.
REv. (Dec. 4, 2015), http://www.dailybusinessreview.com/id=1202744017736/Florida-Bar-
Board-Votes-to-Keep-Frye-Expert-Witness-Standard?slreturn=20161004142140.
210 PAUL S. MILICH, GEORGIA RULES OF EVIDENCE § 1.1 (2016-2017 ed.).
211 Id.
212 See GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-67 (West 1988) (current version at GA. CODE ANN. §§ 24-7-702,
703 (2016)).
213 Id.
214 MILICH, supra note 210, § 15:3.
215 Id.; see also GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-67.1(f) (West 2010) (current version at GA. CODE ANN.
§§ 24-7-702, 703 (2016)) ("It is the intent of the legislature that, in all civil cases, the courts of the
State of Georgia not be viewed as open to expert evidence that would not be admissible in other
states. Therefore, in interpreting and applying this Code section, the courts of this state may draw
from the opinions of the United States Supreme Court in Daubert .....
216 MILICH, supra note 210, §§ 1.1, 1.3.
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In 2013, Georgia updated its clunky evidence code to bring it into closer
agreement with the Federal Rules, with one important exception: the vestigial
organ of expert opinions in criminal cases remained.217 The same criminal case
expert testimony statute stayed-just under a different numbering system with
the phrase "criminal proceeding" added to the title and text of the statute. 218 Thus,
with the adoption of Daubert for civil cases only, Georgia created a new standard
for criminal cases on its home turf.
4. The West Virginia Rules of Evidence
The "general acceptance" Frye test for admitting scientific evidence,
although still adopted by several states, became secondary when the Rules were
enacted 50 years later.219 Within these Rules, the Daubert standard was
predominantly used when deciding the admissibility of scientific evidence in the
courtroom. Rule 702 states:
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an
opinion or otherwise if... the expert's scientific, technical, or
other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue .... 220
Daubert, which is the standard contained within the Rules, allows
evidence to be admitted without "general acceptance" in the relevant scientific
community.221 Many states, including West Virginia, found the Frye "general
acceptance" test too rigid. Therefore, the Rules, inherently containing the
Daubert standard, became the norm for admitting scientific evidence in criminal
cases across the nation, displacing the Frye standard in federal courts.
However, West Virginia does not strictly adhere to the Frye or Daubert
standards. 222 Although often referred to as a "Daubert-like" test, West Virginia's
standard for admissibility of expert scientific evidence in criminal cases is less
strict than both Frye and Daubert. West Virginia Rule of Evidence 702(b) reads:
"[E]xpert testimony based on a novel scientific theory" is only admissible if the
Daubert factors are met. 3 The Daubert factors, as previously noted, exclude
217 See Robert E. Shields & Leslie J. Bryan, Georgia's New Expert Witness Rule: Daubert &
More, GA. B.J., Oct. 2005, at 16, 18.
218 GA. CODE ANN. § 24-7-707 (West 2015) ("In criminal proceedings, the opinions of experts
on any question of science, skill, trade, or like questions shall always be admissible; and such
opinions may be given on the facts as proved by other witnesses.").
219 FED. R. EVID. 702.
220 Id.
221 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 588-89 (1993).
222 See W. VA. R. EVID. 702.
223 See id. at 702(b).
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expert evidence when testimony is based on a novel theory, methodology,
principle, or procedure, if the evidence is not testable. 24 Thus, although West
Virginia maintains the "gatekeeper" role, in criminal cases this role is only
implemented when "novel scientific" testimony is presented.225 West Virginia's
Rule 702 "reflects an attempt to liberalize the rules governing the admission of
expert testimony., 226 The Rule is therefore one "of admissibility rather than
exclusion," and is considered less stringent than the Rules' incorporation of the
Daubert standard.227 Under the West Virginia Standard, the admissibility of an
expert's scientific methodology is not jeopardized because it is different-and
therefore in dispute-but rather, the weight of the evidence they present may be
decreased.
Under West Virginia's Rule of Evidence 702, the trial court initially
considers whether the scientific testimony presented is based on an inference or
an assertion acquired from scientific methodology. 229 Then, the court ensures the
testimony being offered is relevant to the facts at issue.230 In addition, the expert's
reliability is assessed to determine the reasoning used to get to the conclusions
the given testimony draws.2 31 This involves an assessment of
(a) whether the scientific theory and its conclusion can be and
have been tested; (b) whether the scientific theory has been
subjected to peer review and publication; (c) whether the
scientific theory's actual or potential rate of error is known; and
(d) whether the scientific theory is generally accepted within the
scientific community.232
If after this assessment, the novel scientific testimony raises a question
of admissibility, then (and only then) does the "gatekeeper" role of West Virginia
courts exclude the testimony altogether.
224 See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593 ("Ordinarily, a key question to be answered in determining
whether a theory or technique is scientific knowledge that will assist the trier of fact will be whether
it can be (and has been) tested.").
225 See Harris v. CSX Transp., Inc., 753 S.E.2d 275, 305 (W. Va. 2013) (stating that Daubert
analysis is only required "for evaluating a new and/or novel scientific methodology").
226 See Wiesgram v. Marley Co., 169 F.3d 514, 523 (8th Cir. 1999), aft'd, 528 U.S. 440 (2000).
227 See In re Flood Litig. Coal River Watershed, 668 S.E.2d 203, 210 (W. Va. 2008) (quoting
Arcoren v. United States, 929 F.2d 1235, 1239 (8th Cir. 1991)).
228 See Gentry v. Mangum, 466 S.E.2d 171, 186 (W. Va. 1995) ("Disputes as to the strength of
an expert's credentials, mere differences in the methodology, or lack of textual authority for the
opinion go to the weight and not the admissibility of their testimony.").
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Recently, however, the West Virginia Supreme Court conducted a
reliability analysis without first looking to the "novel" requirement. In this case,
the court found the scientific theory behind expert testimony regarding Gamma-
Hydroxybutyrate intoxication was sufficiently reliable.233 In reaching this
conclusion, the court diluted the "novelty" limitation by establishing specific
ways around two key factors of reliability. The court first set forth specific
rationales for the lack of peer-reviewed publication and a theory's first
appearance in court, including: "(a) the inability to publish in a peer review
journal because of industry control, (b) the testimony is not novel and therefore
of little publication interest, [or] (c) the topic is of little general interest.' 234 The
court next declared an expert's showing that the scientific method is "used by at
least a minority of scientists in the field" sufficient to establish reliability,
overriding the consideration of a theory's general acceptance.235 By effectively
obviating the Wilt factors, the court undermined any actual consideration of a
theory's novelty. This allowed the court to avoid the increased scrutiny
demanded of novel testimony and to avoid engaging in its gatekeeping role.
C. State Surveys on Expert Witness Evidence Rules
State standards that govern the admissibility of expert witness testimony
differ from state to state. Some states have adopted the Daubert standard, some
states have adopted the Frye standard, and some states have adopted neither. The
federal courts and 25 states have adopted some variation of Daubert, and
Daubert is deemed "instructive" in another 10 states. 6 Only 13 states still apply
a Frye or quasi-Frye standard, and 4 others apply their own standards.237
As discussed above, the Frye standard requires a general consensus
among the relevant scientific community in order to admit the expert witness
testimony.238 The Daubert standard, which was later adopted into the Rules,
allows the judge to be the gatekeeper of the reliability of evidence by applying a
three-pronged assessment: "courts are to consider the 'validity' or 'reliability' of
the evidence in question, [its] degree of 'fit' to the facts and issues in the case,
and the risks or dangers that the evidence will confuse the issues or mislead the
jury.,,239 But, even in the aftermath of these landmark cases, states have theliberty to determine which standard, if any, to utilize in their evidentiary rules.
233 See State v. Wakefield, 781 S.E.2d 222, 236 (W. Va. 2015).
234 Id. at 233 (citation omitted).
235 Id. at 234 (citation omitted).
236 See Jones, supra note 185.
237 Id.
238 See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
239 MICHAEL B. BRENNAN & J. Ric GLASS, EXPERT TESTIMONY: FROM DR. SNOW, CHOLERA &
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States that have chosen to continue using the Frye standard in some form
include: Alabama,24°  Arizona,241  California,242  District of Columbia,243
Illinois,244 Kansas,245 Maryland, 246 Michigan, 247 Minnesota,
248 New Jersey, 249
New York,25° Pennsylvania,251 and Washington. It is important to note,
however, that courts in North Dakota, although currently applying Frye, have
urged the state to apply the Daubert factors.253 Alabama's test is referred to as
the Perry/Frye test,254 California's test is called the Kelly/Frye test,255
content/uploads/2012/01/ExpertTestimonyjinthe Context of Jurors-andScience.pdf; see
also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
240 See generally Courtaulds Fibers, Inc. v. Long, 779 So. 2d 198 (Ala. 2000) (stating that
Alabama still uses the general acceptance Frye test).
241 See generally Logerquist v. McVey, 1 P.3d 113 (Ariz. 2000) (applying the Frye test).
242 See generally People v. Leahy, 882 P.2d 321 (Cal. 1994) (concluding the Frye test remains
a prerequisite to admission of new scientific methodology evidence).
243 See generally Bahura v. S.E.W. Inv'rs, 754 A.2d 928 (D.C. 2000) (stating the Frye test
remains the rule of law).
244 See generally People v. Basler, 740 N.E.2d 1 (Ill. 2000) (maintaining that Illinois follows
the Frye test).
245 See State v. Patton, 120 P.3d 760, 783 (Kan. 2005) ("The admissibility of expert testimony
is subject to K.S.A. 60-456(b), but the Fry test acts as a qualification to the K.S.A. 60-456(b)
statutory standard.").
246 See generally Hutton v. State, 663 A.2d 1289 (Md. 1995) (noting that the Maryland courts
have adopted the Frye standard for scientific evidence).
247 See generally Gilbert v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 685 N.W.2d 391 (Mich. 2004) (holding
that Daubert did not overrule Frye and its progeny, but rather built upon it).
248 See Goeb v. Tharaldson, 615 N.W.2d 800, 814 (Minn. 2000) ("[W]e reaffirm our adherence
to the Frye-Mack standard and reject Daubert.").
249 See generally Hisenaj v. Kuehner, 942 A.2d 769 (N.J. 2008).
250 See generally People v. Wesley, 633 N.E.2d 451 (N.Y. 1994) (applying the Frye test to
forensic scientific evidence).
251 See Grady v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 839 A.2d 1038, 1044 (Pa. 2003) ("After careful consideration,
we conclude that the Frye rule will continue to be applied in Pennsylvania.").
252 See generally State v. Riker, 869 P.2d 43 (Wash. 1994) (applying the Frye standard).
253 See State v. Hernandez, 707 N.W.2d 449, 461 (N.D. 2005) (Crothers, J., concurring) ("[I]t
is time we consider adopting Daubert and its progeny as the law in North Dakota.").
254 See generally Exparte Perry, 586 So. 2d 242 (Ala. 1991).
255 See People v. Kelly, 549 P.2d 1240, 1244 (Cal. 1976) ("We have expressly adopted the
foregoing Frye test and California courts, when faced with a novel method of proof, have required
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Maryland's is called the Frye/Reed test,25 6 Michigan uses the Davis/Frye test,257
and New Jersey uses an admissibility test that originates from the Frye test.
258
States adopting the Daubert test or a similar test for the admissibility of
expert witness evidence have adopted the Rules, since Daubert is the federal
standard. These states include: Alaska,259 Arkansas (uses Daubert factors but
only to novel evidence, methodology, or theory),260 Colorado (may consider
Daubert factors at the trial court level),26' Connecticut and Delaware (allow trial
courts to decide whether Daubert reliability factors are used and expands
Daubert's applicability to technical and specialized knowledge),262 Florida,263
Georgia (applies Daubert to civil cases but Frye to criminal),264 Hawaii (allows
trial courts the discretion to apply Daubert's flexible factors),265 Idaho (adopts
most of the Daubert factors),266 Indiana (allows Daubert factors to guide courts,
but not necessarily govern), 267 Iowa (allows trial courts discretion in applying
Daubert factors),268 Kentucky (adopts Daubert factors but says such factors are
not exclusive),26 9 Louisiana,27° Maine and Massachusetts (allow general
acceptance in the relevant community to be an independently sufficient factor
256 See generally Reed v. State, 391 A.2d 364 (Md. 1978) (using the Frye analysis to determine
that voiceprint analysis had not yet achieved general acceptance in the scientific community).
257 See generally People v. Davis, 72 N.W.2d 269 (Mich. 1955).
258 See generally State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364 (N.J. 1984).
259 See generally State v. Coon, 974 P.2d 386 (Alaska 1999) (adopting the Daubert standard).
260 See Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of Ark., Inc. v. Foote, 14 S.W.3d 512, 519 (Ark. 2000)
("This court has not previously adopted the holding in Daubert. We do so now.").
261 See generally People v. Shreck, 22 P.3d 68 (Colo. 2001) (en banc).
262 See State v. Porter, 698 A.2d 739, 746 (Conn. 1997) ("[W]e conclude that the Daubert
approach should govern the admissibility of scientific evidence in Connecticut."). See generally
Nelson v. State, 628 A.2d 69 (Del. 1993) (stating the state's case law is consistent with Daubert).
263 See generally Perez v. Bell S. Telecomms., Inc., 138 So. 3d 492, 498 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2014).
264 See generally Mason v. Home Depot USA, 658 S.E.2d 603 (Ga. 2008) (holding that trial
court's use of Daubert standard was appropriate).
265 See generally State v. Montalbo, 828 P.2d 1274 (Haw. 1992).
266 See generally State v. Merwin, 962 P.2d 1026 (Idaho 1998).
267 See generally Steward v. State, 652 N.E.2d 490, 498 (Ind. 1995) ("[A]lthough not binding
upon the determination of state evidentiary law issues, the federal evidence law of Daubert and its
progeny is helpful to the bench and bar in applying Indiana Rule of Evidence 702(b).").
268 See Leaf v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 590 N.W.2d 525, 533 (Iowa 1999) ("We hold that
trial courts are not required to apply the Daubert analysis in considering the admission of expert
testimony. Nevertheless, trial courts may find it helpful, particularly in complex cases .... "). See
generally Ganrud v. Smith, 206 N.W.2d 311 (Iowa 1973).
269 See generally Mitchell v. Commonwealth, 908 S.W.2d 100 (Ky. 1995), overruled in part
by Fugate v. Commonwealth, 993 S.W.2d 931 (Ky. 2013) (overruling case law that conflicts with
the Supreme Court's holding in Daubert).
270 See generally State v. Foret, 628 So. 2d 1116 (La. 1993).
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for admissibility),271 Michigan,272 Mississippi (says Daubert factors are not
mandatory),273 Missouri (applies Daubert as guiding factors),274 Montana (limits
Daubert to novel evidence),275 Nebraska,276 Nevada (allowing Daubert to be
persuasive authority), 277 New Hampshire, 278 New Mexico, 279 North Carolina
(courts are not bound by federal case law but accepts Daubert),28° Ohio,281
Oklahoma (applies Daubert to all scientific testimony, not just expert),
282
Oregon,283 Rhode Island,284 South Carolina,285 Tennessee,286 Texas (applies
Daubert to all expert testimony),287 Utah (applies a stricter form of Daubert with
271 See Commonwealth v. Lanigan, 641 N.E.2d 1342, 1349 (Mass. 1994) ("We suspect that
general acceptance in the relevant scientific community will continue to be the significant, and
often the only, issue [in arguments over the admissibility of scientific evidence]."). See generally
State v. Williams, 388 A.2d 500 (Me. 1978).
272 See Gilbert v. Daimler Chrysler Corp., 685 N.W.2d 391, 409 (Mich. 2004) ("In other words,
both [the Daubert and Frye] tests require courts to exclude junk science; Daubert simply allows
courts to consider more than just 'general acceptance' in determining whether expert testimony
must be excluded.").
273 See generally Miss. Transp. Comm'n v. McLemore, 863 So. 2d 31 (Miss. 2003) (holding
that Daubert factors are illustrative and not mandatory considerations).
274 See generally State Bd. of Registration for the Healing Arts v. McDonagh, 123 S.W.3d 146
(Mo. 2003).
275 See State v. Moore, 885 P.2d 457, 471 (Mont. 1994) ("We conclude that the guidelines set
forth in Daubert are consistent with our previous holding in Barmeyer concerning the admission
of expert testimony of novel scientific evidence, and we, therefore, adopt the Daubert standard for
the admission of scientific expert testimony.").
276 See generally Schafersman v. Agland Coop, 631 N.W.2d 862 (Neb. 2001) (holding that
after October 1, 2001, courts in the state of Nebraska should interpret the state rules of evidence
using the standards set forth in Daubert).
277 See generally Krause Inc. v. Little, 34 P.3d 566 (Nev. 2001).
278 See generally Baker Valley Lumber. v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 813 A.2d 409 (N.H. 2002)
(applying Daubert standard and declining to apply Frye standard).
279 See generally State v. Alberico, 861 P.2d 192 (N.M. 1993) (applying Daubert standards to
New Mexico's state rule of evidence 702).
280 See generally State v. Goode, 461 S.E.2d 631 (N.C. 1995).
281 See generally Miller v. Bike Athletic Co., 687 N.E.2d 735 (Ohio 1998).
282 See Christian r. Gray, 65 P.3d 591, 600 (Okla. 2003) (adopting the Daubert standard for
determining "admissibility of expert testimony in [all] civil matters" in Oklahoma).
283 See generally State v. O'Key, 899 P.2d 663 (Or. 1995) (en banc).
284 See generally State v. Wheeler, 496 A.2d 1382 (R.I. 1985).
285 See generally State v. Council, 515 S.E.2d 508 (S.C. 1999) (declining to adopt Daubert, but
using its factors for guidance under the state rules of evidence).
286 See McDaniel v. CSX Transp. Inc., 955 S.W.2d 257, 265 (Tenn. 1997) ("[W]e conclude
that Tennessee's adoption of Rules 702 and 703 . . . supersede the general acceptance test of
Frye.").
287 See E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 549, 556 (Tex. 1995) ("We
are persuaded by the reasoning in Daubert ... ").
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the Rimmasch approach),288 Vermont,289 West Virginia (applies Daubert to
scientific testimony),290 and Wyoming (says if an expert's methodology is
deemed to be reliable, the court should then determine whether the expert's
testimony applies to the facts of the case).
291
Virginia and Wisconsin outright reject any aspect of both the Frye test
and the Daubert test. Virginia declined to adopt both Frye292 and Daubert in
court decisions, but suggested Daubert may not be abandoned forever in Virginia
evidence rules.293 Instead, Virginia requires the court to make a finding of fact
regarding the reliability of the scientific method offered, unless the method is so
familiar that it does not require a foundation to be established; it is so
fundamentally reliable; its exclusion has "ripened into rules of law[;] ... or...
its admission is regulated by statute., 294 Wisconsin, like Virginia, declined both
tests.295 Wisconsin courts find scientific evidence admissible if: "(1) it is
relevant, (2) the witness is qualified as an expert, and (3) the evidence will assist
the trier of fact in determining an issue of fact.296 Reliability is not considered.297
III. RATIONALIZING THE IRRATIONAL
Despite the availability of Daubert, a noticeable divide has developed
between civil and criminal cases involving scientific evidence. As the concerns
over biased experts continued, Daubert gave judges an activist role in
determining the admissibility of scientific and technical evidence. Suddenly,
judges were thrust into unfamiliar oversight of the scientific validity of the
evidence.
Daubert generated numerous byproducts-most prominently a rise in in
limine hearings in civil cases-as judges explored and adopted their gatekeeping
task. But in criminal cases, a far more "hands-off' practice has developed:
For years in the forensic science community, the dominant
argument against regulating experts was that every time a
forensic scientist steps into a courtroom, his work is vigorously
288 See generally State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388 (Utah 1989), superseded by rule, State v.
Maestas, 299 P.3d 892 (Utah 2012).
289 See generally State v. Brooks, 643 A.2d 226 (Vt. 1993).
290 See generally Wilt v. Buracker, 443 S.E.2d 196 (W. Va. 1993).
291 See generally Bunting v. Jamieson, 984 P.2d 467 (Wyo. 1999).
292 See generally O'Dell v. Commonwealth, 364 S.E.2d 491 (Va. 1988).
293 See generally John v. Im, 559 S.E.2d 694 (Va. 2002).
294 Spencer v. Commonwealth, 393 S.E.2d 609, 621 (Va. 1990).
295 State v. Fischer, 778 N.W.2d 629, 642 (Wis. 2010); Watson v. State, 219 N.W.2d 398, 403
(Wis. 1974).
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peer reviewed and scrutinized by opposing counsel. A forensic
scientist might occasionally make an error in the crime
laboratory, but the crucible of courtroom cross-examination
would expose it at trial. This "crucible," however, turned out to
be utterly ineffective.298
The following section discusses the origins of the reluctance to adopt
Daubert in criminal cases at the federal level, followed by an exploration of state
level issues. Georgia, Florida, and West Virginia again serve as vehicles for
exploring the evolution of the Daubert-based state standards. The section further
discusses Daubert's cost considerations and the constitutional implications of the
disparate treatment that civil and criminal cases receive under the standard.
A. Issues at the Federal Level
The reluctance to adopt Daubert has multiple origins, including cost,
efficiency, and hostility. In an older study from 2000, D. Michael Risinger
collected federal cases in which Daubert had been cited.299 The study
demonstrated the differences between criminal and civil cases. Risinger
identified 120 criminal appeal cases citing Daubert.300 In 67 cases, the defendant
challenged the government evidence, but the prosecution succeeded in 61 cases.
Of the six cases finding for the defendant, only one actually determined that the
government's scientific evidence was unreliable.
30 1
In criminal cases where the defense attempted to bring in its own expert
and were denied, the exclusion was affirmed in 44 of those cases. For the
remaining 10 cases, 7 found a failure to hold a Daubert hearing, but just 1 case
was actually remanded for retrial.30 2 Compare those numbers to civil cases,
where the defendants challenged the admission of the plaintiffs' scientific
evidence: Defendants filed 90% of Daubert appeals and prevailed two-thirds of
the time.30 3
Of course, it is difficult to piece together what actually occurred in a trial
based on appellate decisions. The reported decisions only summarize the big
picture and rarely deal with the minutiae. But the numbers seem to support that
Daubert receives different effect in criminal cases. In criminal cases, the focal
point is on identifying the suspect as the source of evidence (fingerprints, DNA,
bite marks) and linking a suspect to a crime scene (ballistics, hair, fiber). Of these
298 Peter J. Neufeld, The (Near) Irrelevance of Daubert to Criminal Justice: And Some
Suggestions for Reform, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH S107 (2005).
299 D. Michael Risinger, Navigating Expert Reliability: Are Criminal Standards of Certainty
Being Left on the Dock?, 64 ALB. L. REV. 99 (2000).
300 Id. at 104-05.
301 Id. at 105.
302 Id. at 107.
303 Id. at 108.
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methods of identification, DNA profiling is the only one housed in the scientific
rigor of biochemistry and population genetics. 304 DNA profiling has been
subjected to peer review, and DNA testing laboratories are subject to external
quality assurance. Although there are significant theoretical and methodological
gaps in the forensic pattern identification disciplines, 3°5 this evidence-generally
offered by the prosecution-is usually admitted, even sometimes by judicial
notice.30 6 Moreover, even if the methodology is sound (as in DNA), that still does
not mean that it was applied reliably to a particular case.307 Finally, if the defense
objects to the admissibility of the prosecution's forensic evidence (and that is a
big "if'), courts often shift the burden to the defense and require proof of
inadmissibility. This is counter to Daubert, which requires that the proponent of
the expert evidence demonstrate its validity and reliability.308
B. What's the Matter with Kanas Georgia? The State Level Issues
As the use of scientific evidence in civil cases becomes more prominent
(and expected), the threshold issue of admissibility will have to be meted out by
the appellate courts in the states. While Daubert presupposes some level of
gatekeeping, that judicial fact-finding may be scant in a Frye jurisdiction or, as
in Georgia, wholly absent. As discussed, Daubert's adoption at the state court
level has a batting average above .500. Even though Daubert applies to federal
courts, it replaced another federal common law: Frye, which experienced
widespread adoption over the years. Moreover, Rule 702 of the Rules has been
adopted in 38 states, and since Rule 702 bootstraps Daubert, there is reason to
believe that the holdouts will at some point revisit their standards for
admissibility of scientific evidence.
1. The Harper-Georgia Code 24-7-707 Two Step
Georgia's updated statute for expert testimony admissibility in civil
cases was modeled after the Rules and follows the Daubert standard.30 9 Under
this standard, in order to be admitted, the expert testimony must be relevant and
assist the trier of fact.310 Opinions of a witness qualified as an expert may be
given on the facts as proved by other witnesses. Specifically, the statute states:
304 Margaret A. Berger, Expert Testimony in Criminal Proceedings: Questions Daubert Does
Not Answer, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 1125, 1126-27 (2003).
305 See, e.g., Michael J. Saks, Merlin and Solomon: Lessons from the Law's Formative
Encounters with Forensic Identification Science, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 1069, 1081-1127 (1998).
306 See, e.g., United States v. Martinez, 3 F.3d 1191, 1197 (8th Cir. 1993).
307 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993).
308 Id.
309 PAUL S. MILICH, GEORGIA RULES OF EVIDENCE 484 (2013-2014 ed.).
310 Id. at 486.
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If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact
in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education may testify thereto in the form
of an opinion or otherwise, if:
(1) The testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data;
(2) The testimony is the product of reliable principles and
methods; and
(3) The witness has applied the principles and methods reliably
to the facts of the case which have been or will be admitted
into evidence before the trier of fact.311
Although the new code section for expert testimony admissibility in
Georgia civil cases appears identical to the federal standard for expert
admissibility, subsection (f) of the statute contains a difference. Subsection (f)
states, "in interpreting and applying [Georgia Code section 24-7-702], the courts
of this state may draw from the opinions of the United States Supreme Court in
Daubert. . . and other cases in federal courts applying the standards announced
by the United States Supreme Court in these cases. ' '312 In using this language,
one can assume that the Georgia Legislature meant to make use of the Daubert
standard in civil cases permissive, but not mandatory.313
For civil cases, the revised Georgia statute for expert testimony
admissibility offers a substantial amount of guidance for trial courts determining
admissibility. For many proponents of tort reform, this heightened burden for
admissibility is a welcome addition to the Georgia rules because it prevents a
jury from considering evidence of questionable reliability.
The civil cases make clear that Georgia courts fully support Daubert. In
Giannotti v. Beleza Hair Salon, Inc., 314 the Giannottis brought suit against Beleza
Hair Salon for personal injury and loss of consortium after a Beleza
cosmetologist negligently performed hair-coloring treatment on the plaintiff,
causing her to suffer chemical bums.315 The trial court ruled that the testimony
of the plaintiff s expert was inadmissible, and the plaintiff appealed.
The appellate court found the plaintiffs expert, a purported expert in
chemistry, did not use reliable principles and methods to test the hair products in
question.316 The court also found the expert did not reliably apply his principles
and methods to the facts of the case: (1) he did not conduct tests related to the
effects of hair products on human skin; (2) he conducted his tests using a
311 GA. CODE ANN. § 24-7-702 (West 2013).
312 Id.; PAUL S. MILICH, COURTROOM HANDBOOK ON GEORGIA EVIDENCE 324 (West 2012).
313 MILICH, supra note 309, at 322.
314 675 S.E.2d 544 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009).
315 Id. at 545.
316 Id. at 547.
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different chemical than the one applied to the plaintiff; and (3) he used a different
type of heat source in testing the chemical's effects.3 17 Thus, the appellate court
found that the trial court did not err in its decision to exclude the expert's
testimony because the expert did not meet the standard set forth in Georgia Code
section 24-6-67.1 (substantially identical to Georgia Code section 24-7-702).318
Despite progress on the civil side, Georgia seems incapable of
rationalizing its case law with its statutory law when it comes to scientific
evidence in criminal cases. 319 This raises the question: what is the standard?
Georgia Code section 24-7-707 is generous in allowing expert testimony in
criminal proceedings: "Opinions of experts ... shall always be admissible. 32 °
This language is as wide as the net can be cast. Instead of creating a standard or
rule, this statute is the anti-rule. It states the expert's testimony not just may be
admissible, but that it shall always be admissible. 321 This is somewhat contrary
to the Harper standard where the judge decides whether or not the party's expert
evidence has reached a scientific stage of verifiable certainty.
322
While Harper limits the wide net cast by the statute, the judge still has
broad discretion in deciding whether that evidence is verifiable or reliable.323
Over the years, further limitations have appeared, scattered across case law.
324
Now Harper is limited to scientific theories and techniques, meaning "the
evidence offered must hail from a discipline that accepts the skepticism and
rigorous testing indicative of a science. 325 This limitation has only added to the
confusion. Additionally, the Georgia Court of Appeals has stated.that Harper
only applies to an expert's use of scientific tests, procedures, or techniques32 6 and
not to an expert's application of novel or controversial scientific theories or
principles to the facts of the case.327 Again, this is counter to Daubert's reliability
317 Id.
318 Id.
319 See supra Part 1.
320 GA. CODE ANN. § 24-7-707 (West 2013) (emphasis added).
321 Id.
322 See supra Part I.A.4; see also Harper v. State, 292 S.E.2d 389, 395-96 (Ga. 1982); MILICH,
supra note 210, § 15:9.
323 See MILICH, supra note 210, § 15:9 ("The jury has no role in this preliminary matter and the
trial judge can accept any evidence or information that will aid in the decision.").
324 See generally Jones v. State, 586 S.E.2d 224 (Ga. 2003); Jordan v. Ga. Power Co., 466
S.E.2d 601 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995).
325 MILICH, supra note 210, § 15:9.
326 Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. v. Tvrdeich, 602 S.E.2d 297, 301 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004); see also
Orkin Exterminating Co. v. McIntosh, 452 S.E.2d 159, 165 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994) (holding Harper
does not apply to expert testimony that exposure to pesticides caused symptoms because the
defendant's challenge to the testimony was that it was drawn from the evidence, as opposed to
challenging the test or technique).
327 Home Depot, 602 S.E.2d at 301; MILICH, supra note 210, § 15:9.
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standard, and suggests that Harper scrutinizes the use of scientific tests and
theories more than it does novel use of theories or tests. In reality, Harper
actually glazes over reliability.
32 8
Novel and new sciences under Harper have been scrutinized by other
case law questioning "whether the new theory or technique has successfully
passed through the necessary stages of inquiry, testing, and critical review and
has earned its bona fides as valid, reliable, and ready to be used., 329 In
determining whether a new science has reached verifiable certainty, the opinion
of the expert must either be "tested and verified [to be] certainly competent
evidence of the fact" or "the trial judge will review the scientific record, with the
assistance of expert testimony, treatises, and any other information supplied by
the parties and ultimately decide whether there still exists significant doubt, due
to insufficient testing or debatable test results, that the theory is ready for the
courtroom., 330 As a comment on the trend:
[i]n civil cases, courts seem quite up to the tasks of evaluating
microbiology, teratology, and toxicology evidence . . . . Yet
when it comes to evaluating the shortcomings of lip prints and
handwriting, courts are unable to muster the most minimal grasp
of why a standardless form of comparison might lack
evidentiary reliability or trustworthiness.
331
This gives the judge the option to determine, without any other standard, whether
the testimony is reliable.
The question remains: What is the standard? The Georgia Code was
changed and updated decades after the creation of the Harper standard, but
Harper is still the test.332 In 2006, this issue came before the Court of Appeals of
Georgia, right after the 2005 Tort Reform Act in Carlson v. State.333 The Court
of Appeals stated that because the old and new statutes were "almost verbatim,"
the Georgia Legislature did not intend to supersede the standard set by Harper.
334
2. Perpetual Purgatory in Florida
There are no easy answers in Georgia. Meanwhile, the West Virginia
and Florida approaches hinge on the "novel" or "new" aspect of the evidence,
328 MILICH, supra note 2 10, § 15:9 n. 11.
329 Id.
330 Id.
331 Jane Campbell Moriarty, Will History Be Servitude?: The NAS Report on Forensic Science
and the Role of the Judiciary, 2010 UTAH L. REv. 299, 315.
332 See generally Paul C. Giannelli, Ballistics Evidence Under Fire, 25 CRIM. JUST. 50 (2011).
333 See generally Carlson v. State, 634 S.E.2d 410 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006).
334 Id. at 414.
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which despite the Daubert v. Frye distinction, makes the application in each state
more similar than different.
While the Florida Rules of Evidence largely mirror the Federal Rules,
Florida's adherence to Frye is a notable exception, and there has been a
disconnect between the federal and Florida courts since 1993. In 2013, the
Florida Legislature amended the Florida Evidence Code to adopt the Daubert
standard and discard the long-standing Frye standard.335
On December 4, 2015, however, the Florida Bar Board of Governors
recommended that the Florida Supreme Court reject the amendments to Florida
Statute sections 90.702 and 90.704 as rules of evidence and thereby retain Frye
as Florida's test for the admissibility of expert testimony.336 This issue was
controversial, with more than 600 comments submitted by Florida Bar members
and members of the public. Those comments were divided, with the plaintiffs'
bar preferring the retention of Frye and the defense bar favoring adoption of
Daubert.337 The Code and Rules of Evidence Committee experienced a similar
divide, and it recommended, after a narrow 16 to 14 vote, that the Florida
Supreme Court reject Daubert.
338
This would change the shape of Frye's singular application to "new or
novel" science and only considers the acceptance of a particular principle within
its field. In Florida, Frye has sometimes resulted in convictions based on bullet
lead analysis, gunshot residue, hair, or bite mark analyses that, while "generally
accepted" in the criminal investigation community, later betrayed dubious
scientific legitimacy. 339 Daubert would exclude expert opinions and conclusions
founded on overextended or unwarrantable inferences from the facts in
evidence.340
335 See Ch. 2013-107, Laws of Fla., amending Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 90.702 and 90.704.
336 Kay, supra note 209.
337 Florida BarMember Responses, Comments and Attachments: Daubert/Frye, Oct. 26- Nov.
15 2015, FLA. B.,
http://www.floridabar.org/TFB/TFBResources.nsf/Attachments/5BF78BF48AD32DA585257FO
70051C8C6/$FILE/24a%2ODaubert%2OFrye%2OFeedback%20from%2OMembers.pdf?OpenEle
ment (last visited Nov. 3, 2016).





340 In addition, Frye is subject to criticism that it suffers from "cultural lag." Frye is so heavily
steeped in traditional types of evidence that it might actually exclude innovative, yet reliable,
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3. The Novelty of West Virginia
Under Rule 702 of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence, there is a
category of expert testimony based on scientific methodology that is so
longstanding and generally recognized that it may be judicially noticed and a trial
court need not ascertain the basis for its reliability.341 In analyzing the
admissibility of expert testimony under Rule 702 of the West Virginia Rules of
Evidence, the trial court's initial inquiry must consider whether the testimony is
based on an assertion or inference derived from the scientific methodology.342
Moreover, the testimony must be relevant to a fact at issue. Further
assessment should then be made in regard to the expert testimony's reliability by
considering its underlying scientific methodology and reasoning. This includes
an assessment of (a) whether the scientific theory and its conclusion can be and
have been tested; (b) whether the scientific theory has been subjected to peer
review and publication; (c) whether the scientific theory's actual or potential rate
of error is known; and (d) whether the scientific theory is generally accepted
within the scientific community. "Whether a witness is qualified to state an
opinion is a matter which rests within the discretion of the trial court and its
ruling on that point will not ordinarily be disturbed unless it clearly appears that
its discretion has been abused., 343 Thorny problems of admissibility arise when
an expert seeks to base his or her opinion on novel or unorthodox techniques that
have yet to stand the test of time to prove their validity.
Until 1993, West Virginia followed Frye and excluded such innovative
testimony unless the techniques involved had earned "general acceptance" in the
relevant scientific community.344 In deciding whether to admit novel scientific
evidence, a circuit court must consider and make findings on the record. A circuit
court in West Virginia is not required to afford equal weight to each factor, but
instead may balance the factors as it deems appropriate. Nevertheless, whether
the ruling is on admissibility arising from a motion in limine or on summary
judgment, a circuit court must make factual findings sufficient to permit
meaningful appellate review.
C. Contemplating Comparable Standards
As forensic science moves to comparable standards, the Rules of
Evidence and trial practice should follow that lead. The problem with the various
341 See W. VA. R. EvID. 702.
342 Id.
343 Hall v. Nello Teer Co., 203 S.E.2d 145 (W. Va. 1974) (quoting Overton v. Fields, 117 S.E.2d
598, 607 (W. Va. 1960)); see also Bd. of Educ. v. Zando, Martin & Milstead, Inc., 390 S.E.2d 796
(W. Va. 1990) (quoting State v. M.M., 256 S.E.2d 549 (1979)).
344 State v. Clawson, 270 S.E.2d 659, 662 (W. Va. 1980) (explicitly adopting Frye), abrogated
by Wilt v. Buracker, 443 S.E.2d 196, 200-03 (W. Va. 1993).
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confusing standards for admitting expert testimony in criminal cases is that the
confusion extends to practice. Using Georgia as an example, while Harper and
Daubert are similar in that they create "gatekeeping" roles for the judge, the
standards are not the same.345 The standard created by Harper is more lenient
than Daubert, making it is easier to admit expert testimony in criminal cases in
Georgia.346 In Daubert, the Supreme Court set out standards and factors to aid
the judge in determining reliability.347 If ajudge doubts the reliability of an expert
at a Daubert hearing, the judge knows he should consider: testability, rate of
error, peer review and publication, and general acceptance to determine if the
opinion is reliable. 348 But under Harper, what does the judge consider? What the
judge thinks? Merely whether or not the expert is using science? Harper does
not provide the judge with any standard to determine reliability.
3 49
Additionally, because Daubert laid out questions to determine
reliability, Daubert is easier to understand. In the alternative, Harper has been
reinterpreted in case after case.35° Courts are inconsistent with what passes as
admissible because there is little in the way of evidence exclusion in criminal
cases. 351 In Georgia, it is a free-for-all because Georgia Code section 24-7-707
fails to limit expert testimony in criminal cases. 352 The biggest issue with Georgia
Code section 24-7-707 is that even though this statute has been around for
decades, along with Harper, the Georgia General Assembly has been unwilling
to codify Harper in the Georgia Evidence Code.353
Harper and Frye lend themselves to being a vaguer and more liberal
standard than Daubert. This standard becomes even more liberal for a scientific
technique that is no longer novel and thus evidence of reliability is no longer
necessary. In Hawkins v. State, the Georgia Court of Appeals stated that "once a
345 See MILICH, supra note 210, § 15:9 ("[T]here really is not that much difference between
Harper and Daubert. Both go beyond Frye and require that the trial judge take a more active,
gatekeeping role in rejecting expert testimony that is unreliable.").
346 Julie A. Seaman, A Tale of Two Dauberts, 47 GA. L. REV. 889, 891 (2013) ("[A]pplication
of the Harper test is more lenient than Daubert, as evidenced by the long-and ultimately
successful-campaign by 'tort reform' advocates to persuade the legislature to replace it with the
Daubert standard in civil cases.").
347 Compare Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993), with Harper v.
State, 292 S.E.2d 389, 395-96 (Ga. 1982).
348 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589; MILICH, supra note 210, § 15:9.
349 See Harper, 292 S.E.2d at 395-96.
350 MILICH, supra note 210, § 15:9 n.29.
351 Compare Prickett v. State, 469 S.E.2d 371, 374 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996) (stating post-traumatic
stress syndrome has not been established as an admissible scientific principle in Georgia),
overruled by State v. Belt, 505 S.E.2d 1 (Ga. 1998), with Strickland v. State, 479 S.E.2d 125, 131
(Ga. Ct. App. 1996) (allowing evidence of post-traumatic stress syndrome), overruled by Watson
v. State, 777 S.E.2d 677 (Ga. 2015).
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procedure has been utilized for a significant period of time, and expert testimony
has been received thereon in case after case, the trial court does not have to keep
reinventing the wheel; a once novel technology can and does become
commonplace.
3 5 4
The opinion in Hawkins brings forth even more issues with the way
Harper is applied. What length of time constitutes a "significant amount of
time?" How often does a scientific technique need to be presented before it
becomes "commonplace?" With no qualifying guidelines in place for such
questions, courts applying the Harper standard are relying even further on
judges' subjective views of what they think is "commonplace." A judge in one
circuit may have seen and ruled on certain expert evidence-such as roadside
sobriety field tests-often enough that he or she does not require evidence of
reliability because the evidence is now commonplace. Another judge in the same
circuit may have seen the same kind of expert evidence presented the same, less,
or even more times than the first judge, yet still does not consider the expert
evidence commonplace, and therefore requires evidence of reliability.
The problems with Harper and Frye only begin with a subjective view
on the necessity of reliability evidence. To be clear, courts have stated that even
if expert scientific evidence is "generally admitted" by being an "accepted,
common procedure that has reached a state of verifiable certainty in the scientific
community," defendants still have a right to challenge the application of the
scientific technique in question.355 Although defendants seem to be able to
challenge the application of the scientific technique through cross examination,
the general admission of certain scientific evidence creates a presumption of
reliability to the jury that must be actively objected to by the defense. This
effectively removes the prosecution's burden of proving that the forensic
examiner "substantially performed the scientific procedures in an acceptable
manner." 35
6
For generally accepted scientific evidence, the "first component of the
foundation for the admission of scientific evidence, that is, that 'the scientific
principle and techniques.., are valid and capable of producing reliable results'
is presumptively satisfied., 357 So not only do courts in Frye (or Harper-esque)
states assume with certain evidence that it is reliable, but the defendant must
actively prove that the normally reliable evidence came about in the wrong
manner. At least with the Daubert standard, nothing is presumed and the burden
remains on the offering party to prove that their scientific evidence is admissible
throughout all of the listed elements. Daubert relies more on the true power of
the attorneys and the court to do their job properly by arguing expert scientific
354 Hawkins v. State, 476 S.E.2d 803, 807 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996).
355 State v. Tousley, 611 S.E.2d 139, 144-45 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005) (quoting State v. Pierce, 596
S.E.2d 725, 728 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004)).
356 Id.
357 Id. at 144 (quoting Johnson v. State, 448 S.E.2d 177, 179 (Ga. 1994)).
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evidence on the applicable standards, rather than arbitrarily allowing for some
evidence to go to the jury based on one judge's experience.
Daubert, however, is not without its share of critics and controversy. In
a more recent study on the effect of Daubert in state and federal cases with
similar subject matter, one scholar compiled the results of Daubert hearings in a
number of cases involving experts that were most used in both civil and criminal
contexts. The study showed that prosecution evidence posited by a handwriting
expert was admitted in 90% of criminal cases but less than 40% of civil cases;
expert testimony in fire cause cases was admitted around 75% for both criminal
and civil cases. 8
This shows the inconsistency through which judges apply Daubert
towards already established scientific practices such as handwriting analysis,
even in the absence of tightly controlled standards in the handwriting analysis
scientific community, as compared to the more universally agreed upon
standards of the fire origin science community. Although it is an inconsistency
that trial courts are trying to eliminate with each standard, Daubert is still worlds
ahead of Harper and Frye. With the Daubert standard, inconsistency emerges
after all factors are applied, whereas Harper creates inconsistencies not only
upon application of factors, but which factors a trial court must consider.
Narrowing the evidentiary standard by adopting Daubert would have a
lasting effect, not only on evidence going to the jury, but also on the
responsibilities of attorneys and the judiciary. Judges' subjective views would
no longer strictly control the flow of scientific expert evidence, instead they
would have to hear arguments under the reliability factors. Application of
Daubert may result in some inconsistencies between the same expert testimony
in two different cases-and some scientific expert evidence that would
previously be allowed may now be disallowed-but the decision would be made
by applying the Daubert reliability factors. 359 Attorneys would be unable to rely
solely on previously used experts and testimony in order to meet a more liberal
standard, which could result in more preparation, further scientific research, and
more money spent on expert testimony as a whole.3 60 The potential added
expense to expert testimony is outweighed by the result of only the most reliable
scientific evidence going to the jury-something that any attorney would want
in making their cases. In the end, Daubert is the better test because it is easier to
understand and goes directly to reliability.
358 See Seaman, supra note 346, at 908.
359 See Alfred R. Politzer, Georgia's Codification of Daubert: Narrowing the Admissibility of
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D. The Prejudicial Effect
As established above, because Frye and Harper are more lenient in
allowing expert testimony, weak conclusions are more likely to be presented to
the jury.36 1 Therefore, jury instructions must be careful with language.362 The
jury does not have to accept the scientific technique as reliable as that
responsibility belongs to the judge, but the jury is supposed to determine
credibility.363 This is problematic because, once the jury has heard the judge
accept a witness as an expert, it could be difficult for the jury not to rely on what
the expert says.364
Perhaps Frye or Harper permit more trust in juries and more
transparency in the courts by allowing juries to hear evidence that would
otherwise be inadmissible. And perhaps these standards push scientific
communities to progress towards standardized methodologies faster.365 But to
trust that juries, who are not lawyers or scientists, will ignore the prejudicial
effects of this evidence remains a major issue in the legal community.
Additionally, to allow juries to hear arguments that expert testimony is "non-
science," while the scientific communities play "catch-up" with their standards
and procedures, is a dangerous waiting game.
A good example of the prejudicial issues Frye and Harper create is when
character evidence under the Rules is introduced at trial. Under Rule 404,
bringing in character evidence to prove a person acted in conformity with that
character is generally prohibited.366 Several well-mapped exceptions3 67 to Rule
361 See supra Part I.A; see also MILICH, supra note 210, § 15:9 ("If the basic science and
techniques used by the expert are reliable, the fact that the expert's conclusions are weak or subject
to a certain margin of error usually goes to weight, not admissibility.").
362 MILICH, supra note 210, § 15:9.
363 See id.
364 See Anna Roberts, (Re)Forming the Jury: Detection and Disinfection of Implicit Juror Bias,
44 CoNN. L. REv. 827, 827 (2012).
365 See Jennifer L. Mnookin et al., The Need for a Research Culture in the Forensic Sciences,
58 UCLA L. REv. 725, 778-79 (2011) (arguing for more transparency and better research methods
from forensic sciences).
366 FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(1) ("Evidence of a person's character or character trait is not
admissible to prove that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character
or trait.").
367 FED R. EvID. 404(a)(2). Rule 404 states the rules as follows:
The following exceptions apply in a criminal case:
(A) a defendant may offer evidence of the defendant's pertinent trait, and if
the evidence is admitted, the prosecutor may offer evidence to rebut it;
(B) subject to the limitations in Rule 412, a defendant may offer evidence of
an alleged victim's pertinent trait, and if the evidence is admitted, the
prosecutor may:
(i) offer evidence to rebut it; and
(ii) offer evidence of the defendant's same trait; and
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404 exist, but it is always inappropriate to use character evidence for improper
propensity purposes.368 For example, it would be improper propensity evidence
under Rule 404(b) to bring in evidence of a prior drug conviction of a criminal
defendant on trial for drug use. It is improper to bring in this evidence to prove
that because the criminal defendant did drugs in the past, he is a druggie now,
and he did drugs this time.3 69 The Rules prohibit this for two main reasons. First,
the propensity inference can possibly lead to improper conclusions. 370 Just
because someone has done something in the past does not mean that individual
did it again in the current matter. Secondly, "the propensity inference would
almost always be supported by evidence that carries a significant risk of unfair
prejudice. 37 1 It is undoubtedly prejudicial to bring in past crimes and bad acts
because it puts a poor light on the character of the criminal defendant.37
With every rule comes an exception, and Rule 404(b) is no exception to
this rule. Under Rule 404(b)(2), crimes, wrongs, or other acts can come in for
373non-propensity use. 3 Those exceptions for bringing in the character evidence
include: "motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity,
absence of mistake, or lack of accident., 374 Elaborating on the prior drug using
criminal defendant mentioned above, in relation to Rule 404(b)(2): this
defendant is accused of using heroin via injection. In his prior conviction for drug
use, he was found injecting heroin. The prosecutor now argues that-instead of
improper propensity showing the defendant did drugs in the past, he is a druggie,
so he was doing drugs now-the old conviction comes in to show he knows how
to inject heroin; that he has knowledge. Knowledge is one of the permitted uses
for non-propensity character evidence.
3 71
While it is true that what would be inadmissible evidence does have
some use in showing something besides character for wrongdoing, the evidence
still brings the entire propensity purpose with it to the jury.37 6 Regarding the
example above: even though the defendant's past drug conviction is coming in
(C) in a homicide case, the prosecutor may offer evidence of the alleged
victim's trait of peacefulness to rebut evidence that the victim was the first
aggressor.
Id.
368 FED. R. EvID. 404(b)(1).
369 ARTHUR BEST, EXAMPLES & EXPLANATIONS: EVIDENCE 37 (9th ed. 2015).
370 Id. at 34.
371 Id.
372 Id.
373 FED. R. EVD. 404(b)(2) ("This evidence may be admissible for another purpose, such as a
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to show he knows how to inject heroin, the fact that he has a conviction for heroin
use is coming in as well. To put this in the Rule's terms: even though the drug
use is showing knowledge, it is also showing propensity to do drugs.377
Some protections do exist for the criminal defendant when this kind of
evidence is admitted. Generally, Rule 404(b)(2) evidence is met with a limiting
instruction to the jury, telling the jury only to use it for the Rule 404(b)(2)
purpose.378 But the truth of the matter is that the propensity still came in. Even
though the conviction might show knowledge, the conviction told the jury that
this defendant has done drugs before so he probably did them again this time.
Frye creates the same prejudicial effect for jurors in criminal cases. What
the jury does hear is that the expert is reliable, and that the testifying witness is
an expert in his or her field. Even if the opinion is weak, that opinion still goes
to the jury because the jury determines the weight and credibility of the evidence.
But because the judge has already put the stamp of approval on the expert, the
jury might be more willing to adopt that approval. Because admissibility hearings
are done outside the presence of the jury, it is important that the expert be in fact,
an expert. Daubert experts are subject to a clearer and more rigorous standard of
reliability.3 79 The less clear the standard, the more important it is for the jury to
understand their role. But in a criminal case-even though the law states a person
is innocent until proven guilty38-- jurors still have bias. Jurors are human. Much
like the propensity evidence coming in to show another purpose with the
improper propensity stamped all over it, the expert's opinion comes in with the
judge's stamp of reliability all over it.
E. Cost Considerations
Since its creation in 1993, opponents of the Daubert standard have
argued that it increases the cost of litigation.381 Expert reports are lengthy;
hearings take time and money. Those parties with the funds (whether corporate
defendants or resourceful prosecutors) can afford to inundate their opponents
with motions and extensive discovery on the experts.382 A research project
known as the "Delaware Study" examined the legal maneuvering that well-
377 See FED. R. EVID. 404.
378 See, e.g., U.S. v. Sroufe, 579 F. App'x 974, 977 (1 1th Cir. 2014) (giving the jury a
cautionary instruction in using evidence admitted under Rule 404(b) to not use that evidence
regarding liability).
379 See supra Part I.A.2.
380 Coffin v. U.S., 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895) ("The principle that there is a presumption of
innocence in favor of the accused is the undoubted law, axiomatic and elementary, and its
enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal law."); see also GA. CODE
ANN. § 16-1-15 (West 2015) ("Every person is presumed innocent until proved guilty.").
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funded parties can engage in under Daubert.383 The authors (who were not
lawyers) interviewed a non-random sample of practicing Delaware attorneys and
judges.384 The stated goal was to determine the impact of Daubert on litigation.385
The study recognized that plaintiffs bore the heaviest burden stemming from
Daubert.386 Nonetheless, defense attorneys in Delaware did not beat the drums
about "junk science." 387 But, the civil defense attorneys did admit to utilizing
Daubert to their advantage as "leverage in civil disputes. 388
Some might argue that part of this is the point of Daubert: to expose
holes in the theory of the case and push it to a settlement-at least on the civil
side. Daubert might also change charging and plea decisions on the criminal end.
Yes, Daubert brings increased costs, but at the same time it also requires that the
government truly prove a case to beyond a reasonable doubt and it likewise
prevents the parties from sandbagging each other with expert witnesses.
389
Moreover, federal civil practice demonstrates that courts can address
Daubert motions in an organized and efficient manner. Daubert needs not be the
four-factor hydra that its opponents make it out to be. Federal courts have
emphasized that it is within a trial judge's discretion to decide Daubert motions
on briefing and argument alone, without the need for evidentiary proceedings.39 °
This discretion provides wide latitude for trial judges to assess more routine
Daubert motions in a way that keeps cost and time down. Indeed, a court could
dispense with drawn-out evidentiary hearings for weaker motions. 391 This would
still afford litigants their due process rights to challenge expert evidence. If state
383 Nicole L. Waters & Jessica P. Hodge, The Effects of the Daubert Trilogy in Delaware
Superior Court, NCSC (2005),
https://www.ncsc.org/-/media/Files/PDF/Services%20and%20Experts/Areas%20of/20expertise
/Civil%20Justice/Daubert-Final.ashx. The study was not an unbiased product, as it was funded by
corporate entities with strong footholds in Delaware. In its 2009 annual report, the National Center
for State Courts acknowledged substantial funding from corporate defendants including Allstate,
Eli Lilly, ExxonMobil, Ford, General Electric, Johnson & Johnson, Liberty Mutual, Pfizer,
Schering-Plough, Shell, State Farm, Wyeth, and dozens of large defense-oriented law firms.
384 Id.
385 Id. at 7.
386 Id. at 17-18.
387 Id. at 21.
388 Id.
389 Id. at 19.
390 See United States v. Hansen, 262 F.3d 1217, 1234 (1 1th Cir. 2001) ("Daubert hearings are
not required, but may be helpful in 'complicated cases involving multiple expert witnesses."');
City of Tuscaloosa v. Harcros Chems., 158 F.3d 548, 564 (11th Cir 1998); United States v.
Sebbern, No. 10 C. 87(SLT), 2012 WL 5989813 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2012) (in challenge to
ballistics testimony Daubert hearing was not necessary); United States v. Scarpon, No. 05-20419-
CR, 2006 WL 5100541 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 12, 2006) (denying motion for Daubert hearing on ground
that defendant's objections were vague and conclusory).
391 Draft White Paper, supra note 190, at 9-10.
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courts can implement Daubert in a way that makes adoption less taxing, then
Daubert should not overload the system or delay cases at the expense of the
parties.
F. Constitutional Questions
Admittedly, the constitutional aspect of disparate evidence standards is
not the point of this Article, but it should be noted in more than just a footnote.
This is perhaps more applicable in Georgia than other states due to the blatant
schism between the civil and criminal standards.
In particular, some objections to the use of Harper touch on the
unconstitutionality of applying a different standard to criminal defendants than
the standard applied to civil parties.392 Many of the objections made by criminal
defendants articulate that the different standards violate the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.393 Put simply, for the purposes of this
Article, the Equal Protection Clause provides that states cannot deny persons
equal protection under the law.394 Today, this is understood to mean the
government will treat similar individuals in a similar manner.395 Notably, the
government is still allowed to classify individuals as long as it is rationally
based.396 But a rational basis generally requires a legitimate government end or
must advance a legitimate government purpose.397
In Mason v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., the Georgia Supreme Court held
that criminal and civil litigants are not similarly situated; therefore, a different
standard between the two is not unconstitutional. 398 This holding was based on
392 See Carruth v. State, 649 S.E.2d 557, 559 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007) ("[The defendant] contends
that the disparity in evidentiary standards for criminal cases under Georgia versus federal law
violates the equal protection rights secured by both the Georgia and United States Constitutions.").
393 Id.; see also Mason v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 658 S.E.2d 603,614 (Ga. 2008) (Hunstein,
J., dissenting) (suggesting that it is actually the civil litigant who is disadvantaged because he has
the heightened standard).
394 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States... nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.").
395 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOwAK, 3 TREATISE ON CONST. L. § 18.2(a) (2014).
396 See id. ("It does not reject the government's ability to classify persons or 'draw lines' in the
creation and application of laws, but it does guarantee that those classifications will not be based
upon impermissible criteria or arbitrarily used to burden a group of individuals.").
397 Id.
398 Mason, 658 S.E.2d at 607; see also Dohany v. Rogers, 281 U.S. 362, 369 (1930) (holding
legislatures may adopt one procedure for one class and a different procedure for another class);
Woodward v. State, 496 S.E.2d 896, 900-01 (Ga. 1998) (stating individuals in Georgia are
similarly situated to each other only if they are charged with the same crime).
[Vol. 119
50
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 119, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 9
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol119/iss2/9
AN UNCIVIL ACTION
the idea that to be similarly situated, litigants must be charged with the same
offense or cause of action.399
Justice Carol W. Hunstein dissented to this holding, stating that civil and
criminal litigants are similarly situated and "no rational basis exists for treating
them differently., 400 The dissent notes that the Georgia General Assembly made
a point to require expert testimony in civil cases "be the product of reliable
principles and methods applied reliably to the facts of the case., 40 1 But where is
this qualification for criminal cases? Instead of applying the Daubert principles
to both civil and criminal cases, the Georgia General Assembly left the door wide
open with Georgia Code section 24-7-707 in criminal cases.40 2 Justice Hunstein
astutely observed that, just because the court had found other civil and criminal
parties not similarly situated in other cases, this finding does not make them
never similarly situated.40 3
Beyond Georgia, no rational reason exists for civil cases to receive the
luxury of "opinion testimony that is the product of reliable principles and
methods applied reliably to the facts of a case. 40 4 In the federal system, having
Daubert apply to criminal cases in name but not practice sets up a
disproportionate structure. Some judges will apply Daubert in the criminal
context, but many do not. Consequently, individuals charged with the same
crimes do not have equal opportunities to challenge the evidence against them.
Civil and criminal litigants are "equally situated when it comes to the need for
qualified, reliable expert opinion testimony at trial., 40 5 Instead, Harper and
Georgia Code section 24-7-707 create the "untenable situation where the same
evidence proffered by the same expert witness for the same purpose may be
allowed in criminal trials but excluded in civil trials. 40 6
Taking these principles and applying them to similar civil and criminal
claims reveals the flaws in relation to different expert standards. For example,
assume that an individual is charged with murder in Georgia and is also civilly
sued by the victim's family for wrongful death. The case hinges on bite mark
evidence. The plaintiffs in the civil action also retain the bite mark expert used
in the criminal prosecution. The expert employs the same scientific tests and
procedures for both trials in his testimony, and the quality of the data analyzed
in both trials is equal. Even though the evidence is identical, except for the actual
399 Mason, 658 S.E.2d at 607.
400 Id. at 613 (Hunstein, J., dissenting).
401 Id. at 612.
402 See GA. CODE ANN. § 24-7-707 (West 2016).
403 Mason, 658 S.E.2d at 612-13 (Hunstein, J., dissenting).
404 Id. at 612.
405 Id. at 613.
406 Id. (emphasis added).
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pattern of the bite marks, the expert's testimony is deemed admissible in the
criminal trial, but inadmissible in the civil trial.
This happened because, at the civil trial, the expert's testimony
underwent a Daubert analysis and at the criminal, the expert's testimony
underwent a Harper analysis. The Daubert analysis likely revealed the bite mark
determination was inadmissible and unreliable.4 °7 Alternatively, the criminal
court, through a Harper hearing, found the evidence reliable because the judge
had the authority to consider whether the evidence reached a "scientific stage of
verifiable certainty. 4 °8 The same could also be said of an outcome in a Frye state
where the civil action proceeds federally.
Bite mark analysis is a good example of this predicament because it has
been heavily scrutinized in recent years.40 9 The guidelines to analyzing bite
marks fail to indicate "the criteria necessary for using each method to determine
whether the bite mark can be related to a person's dentition and with what degree
of probability., 410 Further, most bite mark analysis is made by comparing a mold
made of a consenting individuals mouth and comparing it to the bite mark, as
opposed to comparing the bite mark to multiple individual's mouths. 411 This
conclusion automatically calls reliability into question because "there is no
established science indicating what percentage of the population or subgroup of
the population could also have produced the bite. 412 Daubert disallows evidence
like this because Daubert specifically looks for reliability and testability, which
are clearly called into question with bite mark analysis.413
This treatment flies in the face of a "full and fair trial. 414 All litigants
should be similarly situated when it comes to the admissibility of reliable
407 See supra Part II.A.3.
408 Harper v. State, 292 S.E.2d 389, 395-96 (Ga. 1982).
409 Jonathan Jones, Forensic Tools: What's Reliable and What's Not-So-Scientific, FRONTLINE
(Apr. 17, 2012), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/criminal-justice/real-csi/forensic-tools-
whats-reliable-and-whats-not-so-scientific/; see also Meagan Flynn, Texas Forensic Science
Commission: Bite Mark Evidence is Junk UntilProven Otherwise, HOUSTONPRESS (Feb. 18, 2016),
http ://www.houstonpress.com/news/texas-forensic-science-commission-bite-mark-evidence-is-
junk-until-proven-otherwise-8166329.
410 NAT'L ACAD. OF SCIS., STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH
FORWARD 174 (2009), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/grants/228091.pdf.
411 Id.
412 Id.
413 See supra Part I.A.2.
414 THOMAS H. CALVERT, 9 THE FEDERAL STATUTES ANNOTATED: CONTAINING ALL THE LAWS
OF THE UNITED STATES OF A GENERAL AND PERMANENT NATURE IN FORCE ON THE FIRST DAY OF
JANUARY, 1903, at 432 (1906) ("Where a party has had the benefit of a full and fair trial in the
several courts of his own state, whose jurisdiction was invoked by himself, and his rights were
measured not by laws made to affect him individually, but by general provisions of law applicable
to all those in like condition, he cannot claim to have been deprived of property without due process
of law." (citing Marchant v. Pa. R.R. Co., 153 U.S. 380, 385 (1894)).
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evidence. No greater need for reliable evidence exists in civil cases than criminal
cases. This "violates the equal protection clause of the United States" because
"[t]here is, and can be, no legitimate, rational reason to distinguish between the
nature of the litigation when it comes to the admissibility of the same testimony
by the same expert witness., 415 Simply put, there is no rational reason to provide
criminal defendants with separate but equal expert standards.
IV. BRINGING SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE STANDARDS
INTO THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
For no good reason, civil expert evidence receives more scrutiny than
what goes on in criminal litigation. This seems contrary to a common sense
expectation that the admissibility of evidence should be determined regardless of
the civil/criminal divide (except that prosecutions carry a high burden of proof).
Scientific evidence should receive equal treatment, and this is especially true in
American trials, where the expert witness sits atop the pedestal of witnesses. A
jury may view an expert witness as "an objective authority figure more
knowledgeable and credible than the typical lay witness, ' '416 because the
expertise relates to substance that exceeds the common knowledge of the jury. A
jury does not possess the requisite legal and scientific skill to thoroughly evaluate
the reliability of an expert's opinion. This amplified influence and separation
removes the expert from the jury's usual assessment of credibility and reliability.
Instead, an expert witness is "generally unfettered" by many of the evidentiary
constraints that restrict the testimony of lay witnesses: experts are not required
to have firsthand knowledge, they can use inadmissible evidence to form the
bases of their opinions, and they can sometimes even testify as to the ultimate
issue in the case.417
If reasonable policy reasons exist for maintaining different standards for
criminal and civil cases, they would be articulated here. But they are not. Simply
put, states should embrace Daubert for criminal cases as well. This would hold
experts to the same level of accountability. A forensic chemist or medical
examiner's theories should not receive a free pass in a criminal case when the
same would be excluded in a civil case.418
415 Mason v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 658 S.E.2d 603, 612-13 (Ga. 2008) (Hunstein, J.,
dissenting).
416 In re Christus Spohn Hosp. Kleberg, 222 S.W.3d 434, 440 (Tex. 2007).
417 Id.
418 Wills v. Amerada Hess Corp., 379 F.3d 32, 48-50 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding district court did
not abuse discretion by excluding forensic toxicologist's oncogene theory of causation of cancer
because theory was not generally accepted, was not supported by testing or peer-reviewed
literature, and rate of error was unknown, expert relied on affidavit of an unqualified and untrained
seaman to quantify dosage of exposure, and expert did not account for smoking as possible cause
of cancer); DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Hillhouse, 161 S.W.3d 541, 553-55 (Tex. Ct. App. 2004)
(explaining how the medical forensic expert's opinion that depowered air bag would have
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A weaker standard in criminal cases may make it easier to win cases, but
not the right ones. While it is true that, in a non-Daubert system, the criminal
defendant should be able to bring in expert testimony to the same extent that the
government does, the lack of resources often makes this an impossible hurdle
that cannot be crossed. The Sixth Amendment only provides for the assistance
of counsel, not the assistance of experts.419
It could be argued that because the criminal and civil trials have different
burdens of proof, the evidence should also be treated differently. 420 Given that a
higher burden of proof exists in criminal cases, should not the admissibility of
expert testimony be held to just as high a standard? It would make sense for the
expert's testimony to be true "beyond a reasonable doubt" when the court asks
the jury to make a determination of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. In fact, a
higher burden of proof in criminal cases suggests that those cases deserve more
protection and scrutiny.421
Weak admissibility standards create a situation where "beyond a
reasonable doubt" is based on weak, unreliable expert testimony. It should be
criminal defendants-whose liberties are on the line-who receive the benefit of
Daubert's rigor. Having relaxed standards creates a situation where prejudicial
evidence easily comes before the jury.422 The judge puts a stamp of reliability on
the expert's testimony for the jury to see.423 While judges may be careful to
instruct the jury that they have the power to determine credibility, the jurors,
subject to their own biases, will have a difficult time separating credibility from
reliability.
424
"[L]aw and science are intersecting with increasing regularity," and,
thus, scientific and legal reliability are inextricably intertwined.425 At this
intersection, we have the ability to restrict scientific evidence to only that which
is relevant and reliable. This seems fairly uncomplicated, but the reality of it is
something akin to tiptoeing through a minefield. The NAS Report indicated that
prevented or significantly reduced risk of child's injuries was unreliable and "unsupported by any
meaningful analysis" because expert relied on testing from another expert that was not comparable
and expert did not perform own test). But see Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985) (holding that
when an indigent defendant has made a preliminary showing that his sanity at the time of the
offense will likely be a significant factor at trial, the state must provide access to a psychiatrist to
assist the defendant on the issue, if the defendant cannot otherwise afford one).
419 See Ake, 470 U.S. 68.
420 Compare GA. CODE ANN. § 16-1-5 (2016) ("No person shall be convicted of a crime unless
each element of such crime is proved beyond a reasonable doubt."), with Murray v. State, 505
S.E.2d 746, 748 (Ga. 1998) ("The standard requires only that the finder of fact be inclined by the
evidence toward one side or the other.").
421 See supra Part II.
422 See supra Part III.D.
423 Id.
424 Id.
425 State v. Ayers, 923 N.E.2d 654, 659 (Ohio Ct. App. 2009).
[Vol. 119
54
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 119, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 9
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol119/iss2/9
AN UNCIVIL ACTION
a troubling amount of dubious science has crept into criminal prosecutions."' At
the same time, the facts and questions to be analyzed in a case have grown
increasingly complicated and often exceed the bounds of familiar or general
knowledge. Consequently, there is a heavy reliance upon expert testimony to
make the case. As forensic science moves away from "experience" and
"training" as the foundations for reliability, so too should the courts.
If courts merely accept "experience" or "training" as a substitute for
proof that an expert's opinions are reliable and then only examine the testimony
for gaps in the expert's logic and opinions, an expert can effectively insulate his
or her conclusions from meaningful review by filling gaps in the testimony with
almost any type of data or subjective opinions. This happened routinely in cases
involving hair microscopy. 427 As the law now stands, Daubert provides the best
way to examine whether "there is a sufficient connection between the existing
data and the opinion offered or if there is 'simply too great an analytical gap' for
the expert testimony to be considered reliable. 428
Even when the most susceptible forensic sciences-hair microscopy,
bite marks, and handwriting-are challenged, the courts routinely affirm
admissibility citing earlier decisions rather than developing evidence that might
dictate a different result. 429 Defense lawyers may forego a challenge when faced
with what they perceive to be rock solid evidence (and it could very well be far
from that). Moreover, even if a defense attorney brings a motion in limine to
exclude that evidence, he or she may be ill equipped to competently handle it.
Finally, moving the criminal justice system over to a Daubert stringency
may ameliorate some of the so-called "CSI Effect. 43 ° Prosecutors have
complained that TV shows like CSI and its multiple spinoffs and copycats might
426 See NAS REPORT, supra note 2, at 86-87.
427 See, e.g., People v. Renteria, No. B 174775, 2005 Cal. App. LEXIS 11995, at * 186 (Cal. Ct.
App. Sept. 20, 2005); McGrew v. State, 682 N.E.2d 1289 (Ind. 1997); Johnson v. Commonwealth,
12 S.W.3d 258, 262-63 (Ky. 1999).
428 St. Clair v. Alexander, No. 13-08-00218-CV, 2009 WL 3135812, at * 1, 8 n.4 (Tex. Ct. App.
Sept. 30, 2009). Of course, sometimes experience is necessary to fill gaps when the data requires
interpretation. Federal Rule 702 requires that the expert reliably apply the principles and methods
to the facts of the specific case. FED. R. EvtD. 702. As explained in the Advisory Committee's
notes, "If the expert purports to apply principles and methods to the facts of the case, it is important
that this application be conducted reliably." FED. R. Evm. 702 advisory committee's note.
Professor Graham describes this test as requiring proof the scientific theory is "employed in a
manner consistent with processes customarily employed by experts in the particular field."
MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 702.5, at 218 (7th ed. 2012). The U.S.
Supreme Court, citing the preliminary draft of Rule 702, stated this principle ensures that courts
examine not only the general reliability of the expert's theory but also the specific question
presented in deciding the particular issues in the case. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509
U.S. 579, 596 (1993).
429 See, e.g., Renteria, 2005 Cal. App. LEXIS 11995, at * 186.
430 Jeff Chesen, The "CSIEffect "-There's No Such Thing as Questions, Just Hidden Answers,
IT'S EVIDENT (July, 2008), http://www.ncstl.org/evident/JulyO8%20ResearchFocus.
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raise jurors' expectations that forensic evidence must be present at trial before
they will convict a defendant.431 CSI-like shows gained widespread popularity in
the 2000s, and are amply represented in syndication. As a result, case law now
acknowledges the possible existence, if not validity, of the CSI Effect.432
I disagree, however, with the notion that CSI only complicates the
prosecution's case.433 The general complaint is that forensic dramas saturate the
airwaves and manipulate the public (i.e., prospective jurors) perception of
criminal investigations to such a degree that it disfavors the prosecution.434 From
the prosecutor's perspective, the burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt
is all the more challenging when a jury demands Hollywood science in cases.435
When the evidence fails to meet that expectation, the specter of acquittal looms
near. This is a lopsided argument, but once the media glommed on a "guilty
people go free" story, the sensationalism (and fear-mongering) legitimized what
was an otherwise speculative claim. Published studies have failed to conclusively
substantiate the theory.436
I submit that it is "equally plausible" that CSI might bolster the
prosecution's case by lending credibility to existing forensic evidence in the
case.4 37 Focusing on the "cause and effect" relationship between CSI and verdicts
misses the larger picture: that junk science is slipping through the cracks, creating
a glut of bad decisions and wrongful convictions. If anything, CSI merely
contributes to an insidious distortion about the infallibility and certainty of
science, and Daubert with its more rigorous approach can mitigate that effect on
both sides of the aisle. The defense also sometimes presents sensational, spurious
evidence.43 8
431 See NAS REPORT, supra note 2, at 48-49.
432 United States v. Fields, 483 F.3d 313, 355 n.39 (5th Cir. 2007) (citing Tom R. Tyler,
Viewing CSI and the Threshold of Guilt: Managing Truth and Justice in Reality and Fiction, 115
YALE L.J. 1050 (2006)).
433 See Gabel, supra note 19, at 247-49.
434 See Kit R. Roane, The CSI Effect: On TV, It's All Slam-Dunk Evidence and Quick
Convictions. Now Juries Expect the Same Thing-and That's a Big Problem, U.S. NEWS (Apr. 7,
2005), http://www.academia.edu/1 191938/The CSI effect.
435 See id.
436 Chesen, supra note 430.
437 Tom R. Tyler, Viewing CSI and the Threshold of Guilt: Managing Truth and Justice in
Reality and Fiction, 115 YALE L.J. 1050, 1052-55 (2006).
438 For example, the proper application of Daubert in a Texas criminal case might have kept
out evidence of"affluenza" in a chilling vehicular homicide case. A psychologist testified that the
teenaged defendant suffered "affluenza," and, as a result, lacks the ability to "link bad behavior
with consequences because his parents taught him that wealth buys privilege." The teenager
received a light sentence despite the tragic death of four people. Michael Muskal, Texas Teen's
Probation for Killing 4 While Driving Drunk Stirs Anger, L.A. TIMES (December 12, 2013),
http://articles.latimes.com/2013/dec/12/nation/la-na-nn-texas-teen-drunk-driving-probation-
affluenza-20131212. Currently, there are no peer-reviewed articles stating that affluenza is or
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A juror study by Judge Donald Shelton concluded that the problem lies
in a more generalized "tech effect," where a high-tech world leads to high-tech
expectations and assumptions. 439 Thus, jurors are more accepting of forensic
evidence and will often conflate reliability with availability. As one academic
points out, "[t]here is widespread evidence indicating that people already
overestimate the probative value of scientific evidence. 44 °
Consequently, the portrayal of science as the ultimate crime-fighting tool
encourages the already existing overconfidence in the value of flawed forensic
findings that jurors-and judges-are confronted with in actual trials. People are
already motivated to find ways to legitimize or justify their desire to provide
finality and render a guilty verdict.441 Interestingly, as a society, we have taught
people to be skeptical of unsupported claims that lack scientific foundation (such
as the "link" between vaccines and autism),442 and in the legal system, we work
overtime to make sure that type of evidence does not creep into civil cases. It
seems that we should afford the same treatment to defendants who challenge
scientific evidence in criminal cases.
Unfortunately, without a rigorous screening process, untested and subpar
science will continue to creep into criminal cases.44 3 Frankly, if there is
should become a bona fide mental health diagnosis, and it is not included in the DSM-5 as a
psychiatric diagnosis. The testimony would seem to violate the Daubert standard, and Texas does
follow Daubert-just not as a rigorously in criminal cases.
439 Donald E. Shelton, Young S. Kim & Gregg Barak, A Study of Juror Expectations and
Demands Concerning Scientific Evidence: Does the "CSI Effect" Exist?, 9 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH.
L. 331, 334 (2006).
440 Tyler, supra note 437, at 1068.
441 Id. at 1071 ("Science provides one way to do so, causing people to see within scientific
evidence the level of certainty that makes them comfortable with a guilty verdict. Here, it is the
credibility of science that is crucial, because jurors seek a form ofjustification that is plausible and
compelling to bolster their own desire for certainty.").
442 See, e.g., Christine Vara, Why We're Still Talking about Vaccines and Autism, SHOT OF
PREVENTION (Mar. 20, 2013), http://shotofprevention.com/2013/03/20/why-were-still-talking-
about-vaccines-and-autism/.
443 A 2007 New Yorker article details the story of N.Y.P.D. detectives who were gunned down
in their unmarked police vehicle while working undercover. The prosecution contended that the
defendant and an accomplice, sitting in the back seat of the detectives' car, shot the detectives in a
robbery attempt. The crime scene evidence included hundreds of hairs and fibers, so prosecutors
recruited criminalist Lisa Faber from the N.Y.P.D. crime lab to testify at the trial. Faber explained
that she analyzed samples of fabric from the detectives' car and opined that all of the fibers in
question could have come from the detectives' vehicle. The criminalist concluded that "the
strongest association you can say is that 'it could have come from' the source in question." Her
testimony was neither remarkable nor reliable. What is remarkable is that DNA tests showed that
blood from one of the detectives was on the defendant's clothing. Moreover, the accomplice flipped
and testified against the shooter. Why did they even use the unnecessary testimony? The criminalist
remarked that her testimony "wasn't crucial," but she thought that perhaps prosecutors used it to
make the case "more 'CSI-esque."' Jeffrey Toobin, The CS[ Effect: The Truth About Forensic
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something better than Daubert that resolves the reliability issues with scientific
evidence in criminal proceedings, I would be all for it. Reality, however, dictates
the most practical result: that Daubert is the best thing we have right now. A little
judicial and lawyer training, coupled with a dose of politicking, might set
Daubert in the right direction in criminal cases.
V. CONCLUSION
There can be little debate that, since Daubert, the legal landscape has
experienced an explosion in expert litigation and epic battles of admissibility,
qualifications, and validity. While this trend is more prominent in federal courts
(that house the cradle of Daubert and Rule 702), the influx of science in state
courts is not far behind. Daubert charges trial courts with the responsibility to
weigh specified criteria and weed out claims or defenses founded on expert
evidence that cannot be shown to be reliable. Frye lacks the ability to keep pace
with the current state of science, research, and technology, and should be retired
in favor of Daubert's more modem, scientifically defensible standard for the
admissibility of expert testimony.444
All courts should follow Daubert for expert testimony in criminal
cases-and abandon the easy road of judicial notice, acquiescence, and apathy-
because "[r]eliable expert opinion testimony is no less important in criminal
cases than it is in civil cases. 445 Adopting Daubert holistically could be deemed
a quixotic quest, but the incongruent treatment of scientific evidence in criminal
and civil cases should be abandoned. Yes, there is unease about hired guns in
civil cases, but the loss of liberty and life in criminal cases warrants equal
concern.
In criminal cases, unlike civil cases, courts have generally been
unwilling to exclude scientific evidence for lack of sufficient validation and
reliability. Scientific reliability and legal reliability should be two sides of the
same coin. Forensic science is raising its reliability bar, and we should raise the
legal bar. When the evidence is admitted, it has received the gold-seal of
reliability. Attaining that seal is all-too-easy in a criminal case. Real analysis of
the evidence is required. Admissibility and reliability determinations rest on
more than satisfaction of a threshold sufficiency factor; they require detailed
consideration of what the evidence demonstrates and how the trier of fact will
weigh it.
A one-size-fits-all Daubert may not be the best approach in theory, but
I believe it is the best approach in practice. The late and esteemed Margaret
Science, THE NEW YORKER (May 7, 2007), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2007/05/07/the-
csi-effect.
444 See supra Part II.
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Berger noted that "[w]hat criminal defendants need in order to deal more
effectively with the forensic identification expertise proffered against them is not
more Daubert, but tools that would enable them to make more cogent evidentiary
arguments-better counsel, access to expert assistance and more discovery.'1
446
That statement is absolutely true, but it will take years of resource reallocations
and legislative lobbying to achieve anything close to it. At this moment, we are
on the cusp of breakthroughs in forensic science. But much like the law, not all
crime labs will immediately adopt the more scientific approach. As one arm of
the criminal justice system, we have a legal obligation to meet the challenge of
new and old evidence with appropriate admissibility standards that reflect the
advancements of science now and in the future. If we fail to do so, then we only
perpetuate the ongoing problem of bad science and wrongful convictions.
446 Berger, supra note 304, at 1140.
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